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Abstract
Over the last decade, workfare programmes provided support to the unemployed only
insofar as they were willing to accept a job. The theoretical underpinnings of these pro-
grammes are that institutional constraints prevent labour supply from adjusting to the
technologically determined requirements of labour demand. We contend that when indi-
viduals look for a job, they generally want to take into account non-monetary features such
as occupational status. Status cannot be traded, it usually is complementary to income, it
determines lifestyles and life possibilities. As for labour demand, its requirements do not
reﬂect eﬃcient behaviour and technical constraints because business ”eﬃciency” cannot be
taken to be a measure of social eﬃciency and technology cannot be used as a benchmark
to assess the eﬃciency of business conduct. We suggest that Sen’s notion of capabilities
may constitute an appropriate benchmark to assess the social eﬃciency of the economic
system. This leads us to a few policy implications. The ”capabilities benchmark” leads us
to stress the importance of freedom to choose how to conduct one’s life. Acting in favour
of freedom involves the understanding of how business strategies aﬀect learning patterns
and available choice sets. It also involves the assessment of policy issues - such as co-
operation between the scientiﬁc community and business, scientiﬁc freedom, educational
goals and their institutional implementation, and unemployment relief systems - which
may inﬂuence the relation between business strategies and social learning.
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Over the last decade, unemployment has increasingly been dealt with by
resorting to active labour market policies. Economists and policy makers
have focused on measures (such as training, incentives, information) that are
expected to raise the eﬃciency of the market. Even though unemployment
relief systems devised under the (post)Keynesian framework are still at work
alternatives have been introduced which consists in making welfare help peo-
ple to gain self-suﬃciency through work. Welfare-to-work or workfare – a
milestone in President Clinton’s and in Prime Minister Blair’s reforms – pro-
vides support to the unemployed only insofar as they are willing to accept a
job.
Despite their alleged superiority to Keynesian measures, these programmes
do not prove to be particularly successful. We believe the reason lies in
their theoretical underpinnings. They assume thatinstitutional constraints
prevent labour supply from adjusting to the (technologically determined) re-
quirements of labour demand. We argue that institutions, far from being
constraints, are major determinants of supply and demand. When a mis-
match occurs, this is due to the diﬀerent institutional requirements underly-
ing supply and demand. Unemployment is not determined by institutions, it
is determined by the mutual inconsistency of institutions. More precisely, it
is caused by business requirements that are inconsistent with social eﬃciency.
We base our discussion of unemployment on Kapp’s notion of social costs.
We contend that unemployment is one such cost. Kapp deﬁnes social costs
as “all direct and indirect losses sustained by third persons or the general
public as a result of unrestrained economic activities” (Kapp 1963b, p. 12).
Although this deﬁnition recalls that of a conventional externality, it is in
no way “a minor and exceptional disturbance” (ibid. p. 9) but “a charac-
teristic phenomenon of the market economy”(ibid.). The diﬀerence lies in
what Kapp views as key features of the economic system. First, contrary to
conventional economics, agents are not atomistic, they interact and, above
all, they can change the rules and the payoﬀs of the economic “games” they
play: this is the upshot of Kapp’s notion of “cost shifting”1. Second, inter-
action also occurs between the economy and the surrounding – natural and
social – environment. It generates feedbacks and an overall process of cu-
mulative causation whereby “the ‘economic’ and the so-called ‘noneconomic’
1“(T)he fact that private entrepreneurs are able to shift part of their total costs of
production to other persons or to the community as a whole, points to one of the most
important limitations of the scope of neoclassical value theory.” (Kapp 1963b, p. 11). See
also Swaney, Evers (1989).
1are intrinsically interrelated” (ibid. p. 12)2. Some of the implications of this
notion of social cost will emerge as we carry out our analysis. They include
distribution, democracy, measurement and methodology. Here, we only wish
to point out that, owing to the systemic openness of the economy, a metric
(relative prices) that is restricted to the market cannot function as a gen-
eral unit of measurement when “noneconomic” (including ethical) issues are
concerned3. The value judgement required to assess social eﬃciency may be
frustrating for whoever seeks an “objective” unit of social accounting. It is,
nonetheless, a necessity4.
The point of departure for our analysis is a brief discussion of active labour
market policies. In the section that follows, we argue that this kind of policy
implicitly assumes that “working” for a market wage is a socially relevant
value, independently of the speciﬁc features a job has. Quite to the contrary,
we contend that when individuals look for a job, they generally want to take
into account its speciﬁc features. In section three we discuss this issue and
argue that when the social evaluation of jobs (in short, occupational status)
is taken into account, the usual economic metric, i.e. money, will not serve its
purpose. Status cannot be traded, it usually is complementary to income, it
determines lifestyles and life possibilities. Moreover, it cognitively inﬂuences
the way preferences – about or related to jobs – are formed and it provides
diﬀerential social resources that aﬀect future choices and courses of action.
These arguments lead us to suggest that attempts to improve one’s status
(e.g. through social mobility) may be positively valued, regardless of their
partly ceremonial substance and of the social scarcity problems. This raises
a problem, however: labour demand requirements do not necessarily fulﬁll
the aspirations of workers; diﬀerent interests and goals are at stake.
Labour demand requirements are generally seen as binding because they
reﬂect eﬃcient behaviour and technical constraints. These aspects are dealt
with in section four. We dispute these claims on two grounds. First, busi-
2“The principle of cumulative or circular causation stresses the fact that social processes
are marked by the interaction of severalvariables both ‘economic’ and ‘noneconomic’ which
in their combined eﬀects move the system away from a position of balance or equilibrium
(Kapp 1963b, p. 25). A more in-depth discussion of the systemic openness of the economy
is in Kapp (1976a).
3“As long as it continues to conﬁne itself to market value, neoclassical economics will
fail to assimilate to its reasoning and to its conceptual system many of the costs (and
returns) which cannot be expressed in dollars and cents. (Kapp 1963b, p. 11).
4“(T)o ignore social costs because they require an evaluation by society [...] and to leave
social losses out of account because they are ‘external’ and ‘noneconomic’ in character,
would be equivalent to attributing no or ‘zero’ value to all social damages which is noless
arbitrary and subjective a judgement than any positive or negative evaluation of social
costs.” (Kapp 1963b, p. 23).
2ness behaviour may be driven by concerns other than competitiveness; more
speciﬁcally, distributive and strategic concerns may underlie the division of
labour as well as the level of employment. Business “eﬃciency” cannot be
taken to be a measure of social eﬃciency. Second, we show the institutional
nature of technological and scientiﬁc research. In particular, technology is
not exogenous with respect to business goals. Both science and technology
are – either explicitly or tacitly – associated to business goals. Technology
cannot therefore be used as a benchmark to assess the eﬃciency of business
conduct.
We suggest that Sen’s notion of capabilities may constitute an appropriate
benchmark to assess the social eﬃciency of the economic system. Based on
this premise, we argue that unemployment should be viewed as a cost in
itself, inasmuch as it reveals that important aspects of well-being have been
endangered. Accordingly, we are less interested in the negative consequences
of unemployment than in the problems that underlie the institutionalised
working of capitalism.
This leads us to a few policy implications, which are discussed in section
ﬁve. Owing to the inconsistency between the requirements of workers and
of business, we argue that a value judgement is required. The “capabilities
benchmark” leads us to stress the importance of freedom to choose how to
conduct one’s life. Acting in favour of freedom involves the understanding of
how business strategies aﬀect learning patterns and available choice sets. It
also involves the assessment of policy issues – such as cooperation between the
scientiﬁc community and business, scientiﬁc freedom, educational goals and
their institutional implementation, and unemployment relief systems – which
may inﬂuence the relation between business strategies and social learning.
2 Tackling unemployment?
2.1 From economic growth to individual employability
During the eighties economic theory has changed the way it explains unem-
ployment. Attention has shifted from external determinants to the inter-
nal functioning of labour markets (Blanchard 1999). In the post-war boom
period up to the seventies external, mainly macroeconomic shocks were im-
puted. Unemployment was claimed to arise when aggregate demand does not
allow labour supply to be fully employed in productive activities. This Key-
nesian view implied that unemployment ought to be tackled by increasing or
stabilizing aggregate demand through ﬁscal and monetary measures, while
social damages could be addressed by public intervention through protective
3measures directed to individuals and families.
In recent years, this view has increasingly been challenged. Focus is
on the rigidities that aﬀect the competitive working of the labour market:
unemployment occurs because the labour market cannot operate as it should.
As a consequence, policy concerns also changed. Mainstream analysts point
to two obstacles: incomplete information and distorted incentives.
Information problems may entail high search costs; this produces ineﬃ-
ciencies and perhaps involuntary (e.g. frictional) unemployment. Optimum
decisions are taken if calculation of utility is based on objective probabilities
of diﬀerent ﬁnal states; even imperfect information, if used at its best, leads
to individually and socially rational behaviour, in the conventional view. Yet,
inasmuch as subjective probabilities do not coincide with objective ones, in-
dividually rational behaviour may lead to socially unpleasant results. For
instance, suppose that skilled individuals reckon that they can ﬁnd another
job, suited to their qualiﬁcation, in a short-time; consequently, they may
assign to temporary unemployment a greater value than low-skilled employ-
ment. If their conjectures are incorrect, involuntary unemployment occurs.
Distorted incentives occur because of Keynesian-style unemployment ben-
eﬁts.5 Subsidies increase the reservation wage of the unemployed who will be
less willing to accept existing jobs at the current market wage rate. Long-
lasting reliance on unemployment beneﬁts reduces motivation to work and
impairs self-conﬁdence.6 As a consequence, duration of unemployment will
certainly increase, and probability to exit unemployment will be reduced
(Layard, Jackman and Nickell 1996; Blanchard 1999). Moreover, beneﬁts
are seized also by those who would have exited unemployment: some peo-
ple may voluntarily postpone exit in order to hold beneﬁts. This produces
ineﬃciencies and raises, in times of resource shortage, moral issues.7
The solution to these problems lies, according to most observers, in mak-
ing the labour market function properly. More speciﬁcally, the goal of wel-
fare policies ought to shift from protection of living standards to increased
responsibility of all parties. Unemployment has thereby increasingly been
5Employment protection schemes are less questioned, as their net eﬀect on unemploy-
ment rates is not clear: they restructure labour market pools, by reducing both entry and
exit ﬂows, so that employment becomes more stable but, at the same time, unemployment
shifts from short-term to long-term. See Blanchard (1999); Layard, Jackman and Nickell
(1996).
6As a result, unemployment may turn from voluntary to involuntary in the long run.
7Solow (1998) stresses that altruism has become scarce with regard to these issues. It
is increasingly considered unacceptable that people earn subsidies even though they are in
principle able to work. The thrust of the argument is that, in a world where wealth is so
widespread, the responsibility of deprivation should fall back on individuals, rather than
on society.
4tackled by resorting to supply-side schemes (Layard 1999). In particular, at-
tention of economists and policy makers has focused on measures to: improve
training and enhance human capital; improve information on market condi-
tions to facilitate job search and job matching; incentivate self-employment;
etc. All this constitutes the so called active labour market policy (ALMP).
In fact, ALMP approaches invalidate the Keynesian basic idea that market
mechanisms may be held responsible for unemployment. On the contrary,
it is believed that unemployment occurs because the labour market cannot
deploy all its potential.
An implicit assumption is that demand conditions constitute an objec-
tive constraint to which supply can only adhere.8 Accordingly, ALMP such
as retraining programs try to enhance the opportunity set of individuals by
making individual choice more suited to demand requirements; on the other
hand, subsidy reduction schemes ﬁnd their rationale in the (social) need to
force hesitant individuals to face reality. Welfare must be reshaped to help
people gain self-suﬃciency through work. Income support cannot be a goal,
it must become an instrument. It should be linked to the condition that re-
cipients are ready to accept job opportunities when these become available:
hence the term “workfare” (from “welfare-to-work”). Individuals should only
be helped to enhance their own employability, deﬁned as “the collection of
workers characteristics, including attitudes towards work, expectations re-
garding employment and wages, and behaviours both in the labour market
and on the job” (Peck and Theodore, 2000b, p.731). Such characteristics
are seen as the factors that mostly aﬀect the probability of ﬁnding a job,
therefore it is a sound policy to try to improve them. Other forms of public
aid, ﬁrst of all the unemployment relief system, should be kept only for the
hopeless losers.
Behind these ideas – and, more speciﬁcally, behind the notion of employ-
ability – lies the presumption that any job is better that no job. This is based
on two aspects. On the one hand, there is the evidence that the involuntary
unemployed are more likely to be aﬀected by poverty, deprivation, abjection.
On the other hand, there is a great social interest in the eﬃcient performance
of the system. Accordingly, it is important that individual preferences and
choices should ﬁt the structure of available jobs. The economic policy con-
sequences are known. For those who end up in the unfortunate conditions
associated to unemployment, the solution is to provide them with a wage,
whatever the job they would like. Reduction of involuntary unemployment –
8By devising the organisation of production – thus, skills, tasks, recruitment practices
etc. – employers deﬁne the characteristicsrequired to participate in the production process.
By the same token, they deﬁne the characteristics that training programmes must provide
to employees in order to ensure job-readiness.
5regardless of the quality of the jobs involved – appears a sensible policy goal.
Moreover, ALMPs such as retraining aim at making labour supply character-
istics ﬁt the demand for labour. As a last resort, individuals may be driven
to comply with the contraints posed by the existing occupational structure
– for instance, by reducing incentives to stay unemployed (e.g. subsidies).
2.2 Unemployment as a qualitative issue
It is questionable whether ALMP and its welfare-to-work variant are appro-
priate as a general solution to the unemployment problem.9 An example may
help us to set out the argument. Consider an economic downturn that causes
job losses in many sectors, thereby aﬀecting high-skilled as well as low-skilled
and unskilled workers. Even if a worker can ﬁnd a new job shortly after dis-
missal, this may or may not be comparable to the previous one. The situation
may be trickier for skilled workers than for low-skilled or unskilled workers.
The latter possess little or no human capital and they may move from one
job to another with little consequences if any. Instead, skilled workers who
accept low-skill jobs must be ready to lose their investment in education,
training etc. Suppose then that a skilled worker wants to preserve her in-
vestment in human capital. On the one hand, she may feel obliged to accept
lower wages and worse working conditions, and perhaps to have decreasing
opportunities to return to her previous occupational standard as her human
capital becomes obsolete and her social relations degrade. Indeed, the mar-
ket mechanism requires her to accept whatever job becomes available. On
the other hand, she may want to beton her future by giving up the unsuited
job and continuing her search. The rationale of her behaviour would be that
expected diﬀerential returns from a high-skill job exceed the loss associated
to the unemployment spell. The ensuing unemployment will be voluntary,
inasmuch as it reﬂects optimal intertemporal choice; instead, it will be invol-
untary, as we noted above, if the decision is biased by imperfect information
(the worker would have chosen the low-skill job, had she had the correct
information).
Given this framework, conventional economics acknowledges a public con-
cern to watch over involuntarily unemployed workers and helpthem to in-
crease the probability to get a job. There is no public interest, instead, to
take care of the voluntary unemployed, whose preferences and ensuing costs
9It is well out the scope of this paper to assess whether such an approach to pol-
icy perfoms better than the Keynesian one in inducing employment growth, or to assess
whether it is succesful or not in terms of its own goal. Critical essays of the new orthodoxy
along these lines are Gardiner (2000); Peck and Theodore (2000b); Kitson, Martin and
Wilkinson (2000); Darity (1999). Under critical scrutiny, here, is the goal itself.
6are essentially private ones.
We believe that, in spite of its commonsensical validity, the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment (and of its policy implica-
tions) is not as clear-cut as it appears. Suppose that our skilled worker simply
does not accept to comply with the emerging economic constraints; she may
have developed a strong taste for good employment, for instance, and wants
to avoid jobs that have unpleasant features – no matter how well they are
paid.10 In other words, we could even suggest that her reservation wage may
be inﬁnite, due to the high value attached to the desired characteristics.
Conventional economics is rather unsympathetic to this behaviour, which
it labels as irrational: in so far as the worker’s decision to stick to a “good”
job is inconsistent with social requirements, it is bound to fail. Thus, her
decision must be based on biased speculation.. Furthermore, unemployment
occuring for these reasons is considered voluntary. It entails only private costs
and it therefore does not deserve the attention of public policy. We think
that such a position is simplistic. Voluntary unemployment of this kind is
an increasing phenomenon, especially in Europe, where it is characterized
by very long spells (especially for formerly skilled workers who cannot ﬁnd
a suitable place in the market), by the young age of the unemployed and by
their relatively high levels of skills and education. The conventional view – do
not take care of the voluntarily unemployed – does not identify any speciﬁc
measure to tackle these problems. We suggest that, to deal with them, we
need to go beyond the explanation that standard economics provides. That
the reservation wage is inﬁnitely high suggests that there are aspects that
cannot apparently be framed in usual monetary terms; or, more accurately,
they can hardly be evaluated according to the standard metric. To this issue
we now turn our attention.
3 The embedded labour market and the for-
mation of labour supply
3.1 Evaluation, comparability and decision
In standard labour economics, only one metric (i.e. utility) exists that, com-
mon to all activities, allows to compare them. Although it is claimed that
utility can only be subjectively evaluated, individual utilities are nonetheless
10The case can be easily extended. For example, a graduate student may have a strong
preference for working in his ﬁeld of study. If he does not get the job, he may decide to
remain unemployed and keep on searching, rather than accept any unrelated job – even if
wages elsewhere rise.
7homogenized at the system level through the “willingness to pay” principle:
how much something is worthy to someone will be reﬂected in the amount
of money he is ready to pay for it. This allows price variation to become the
regulating principle of the market process.
Working will in general not provide utility per se, but only through con-
sumption of the goods and services that the ensuing income aﬀords. The
worker will cease oﬀering his services when the utility he gets from the con-
sumption of goods bought with his marginal earning will equal the disutility
of an additional unit of working time (i.e. the marginal utility of leisure).
The supply of labour services therefore involves a piecemeal decision: as far
as the wage rate is higher than its opportunity cost, the individual oﬀers
a further hour of his services. The model may be reﬁned by plotting work
earnings against the value assigned to any activity alternative to working
(e.g., child care).
This sketch of the simplest textbook model of labour supply may be
enhanced by taking into account that working may grant diﬀerent degrees
of (either positive or negative) satisfaction. The quality of working con-
ditions may be expressed in monetary terms: you can always trade oﬀ a
positive/negative characteristic for some amount of money. Thus, in equilib-
rium unpleasant working conditions must be worth – other things equal – a
monetary bonus, otherwise those vacancies will not be ﬁlled. Fatigue, longer
working time, dirt or pollution can be borne only if the wage makes up for
them: put another way, the wage that is needed to accept an unpleasant job
is, ceteris paribus, higher. Correspondingly, jobs that are “nicer” – whether
for the task involved, the environment where they are carried out, the people
engaged in them, the freedom of will they entail or whatever other feature
but income – will be paid less for any given skill. Equilibrium in the labour
market is ensured by simmetry on the demand side. In particular, a ﬁrm can
acquire any desired type and quantity of labour provided it is willing to pay
the market wage rate. If its demand remains unfulﬁlled, the wage rate should
adjust upwardly to increase the relative attractiveness of the job oﬀered.
This sort of accounting is feasible when the evaluation scale is the same for
any economic activity that yields positive or negative utilities to individuals.
For comparability to obtain – and, by the same token, for the possibility of
market transactions – it is crucial that all aspects can be traded. Suppose
that a job provides both a high income and a number of attractive features,
while it shows no negative attribute, and the skills required by the job are
rather easy to obtain. We expect that supply for that job will be high,
exceeding demand. The market mechanism should guarantee that the wage
falls to the equilibrium level; at the same time, wages for jobsthat encounter
supply shortages will rise to attract workers.
8Things do not always work as expected, however. First of all, the compet-
itive mechanism may fail to operate. There may be economic reasons, such
as when a skill is scarce, whereby the holder may obtain quasi-rents from
her indispensability. Truly, the gain cannot be seized indeﬁnitely: someone
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to obtain that skill and outcompete the insider. How-
ever, some institutional obstacle artiﬁcially hinders the competitive mech-
anism. Access to the worthy occupation may be controlled and restricted
institutionally by insiders. If this happens – as in professions, for instance –,
the wage-reduction eﬀect of an increased labour supply is uncertain at best.
Under these circumstances, the correct policy is, in conventional terms, to
remove institutional obstacles.
A second issue that hampers the competitive mechanism is related to
how valuation and comparability of diﬀerent aspects is carried out. As we
hinted in the previous section, a single aspect of a job may be valued so
much as to outweigh any other characteristic. Jobs where the valued feature
is present dominate the rest. In this case relative wage variations will not
suﬃce to compensate for the loss of the dominant feature. A way to see the
problem is to think of the rate of substitution (RS) between characteristics.
The RS may be very high if, for instance, a worker wants to stick to certain
kinds of jobs; it will nonetheless exists, insofar as the evaluation space is
the same for all characteristics. Inasmuch as the criterion used to value the
various aspect falls in the economic domain, we may expect that the price-
regulating mechanism is hindered but not totally blocked. As an example,
think of a skilled worker who wants to preserve job-speciﬁc human capital: we
may suppose that there will be a threshold above which the money amount
compensates for its loss.11 Unemployment may occur, as we suggested, but
only if the relative wage adjustment is not strong enough to induce people
to switch from one job to another.
Things are diﬀerent if the valuation criterion falls outside of the economic
domain. In this case, a rate of substitution does not exist. This may happen
if a person has a strong preference for some features that only some kinds
of job have, or she may value some issues so much, that she may refuse jobs
that do not comply with them. A couple of examples may be given:
- think of a mother who may want to take care of her children; for her,
subsidized unemployment might be better than full-time work (see Roemer
1998 on this);
- suppose someone is only oﬀered a job by a ﬁrm that produces mines, the
11We allow that wages in the undesired job rise up to a level that would in principle
compensate for the loss of the valued features; we do not discuss whether this level makes
the activity with undesired jobs unproﬁtable.
9end-product of her eﬀort possibly being that many children will be wounded
or killed around the world; if this undermines her moral value whereby other
people’s lives and dignity must never be threatened, she will prefer to stay
unemployed (a specular example may be given by someone who only wants
to work in the environmental protection ﬁeld, even as a volunteer rather than
being employed elsewhere).
Both of these cases introduce social aspects which may conﬂict with stan-
dard economic evaluation. This is the outcome of an economic process that
is embedded in society. In the rest of this section we will stress that the price
mechanism may fail to regulate an embedded labour market; thereby leading
to a number of crucial unemployment related issues. The whole subject is
related to how individuals make their occupational choice. Our suggestion is
that the choice process is socially inﬂuenced in two ways.
First, the choice process is a cultural process based on social interaction
among socialized individuals. Individual behaviour is embedded in the social
context. This means above all that a) the environment we live in deﬁnes the
criteria to assess the appropriateness of our economic and social action and
b) we tend to conform to these social requirements (Blau 1964/1986).12
Second, a social criterion lies at the center of the process of preference
formation. Status is such a principle. We deﬁne people’s status as their
position in a social structure regulated by power and prestige; in some way
it is a measure of their social standing or social honour in a community.
The crucial point is that in contemporary capitalist economies the main
source of status is occupations.13 People tend to deﬁne their own position in
society, moving horizontally or vertically through the occupational structure.
The legitimization of mobility at the societal level makes it an institution-
alized practice (Blau 1964/1986): social entrepreneurship is a most valued
route to self-assertion. This is just a side of a double movement, though: on
the other hand we have a drift by the ruling class to react to the incentives
to mobility that capitalism has introduced.
The social nature of the process of choice entails the complementarity of
the two issues – restriction of competition and social valuation of occupations.
12As has been shown, conformity was a primary concern for Adam Smith, who believed
that an eﬃcient self-regulated economy needs a ﬁrm moral basis (Loasby, 1996, p.315; see
also Hirsch, 1976, p.137). Honourability is a key standard, in this respect. It is achieved
by seeking esteem in the eyes of others, by doing what the community thinks is worth
doing. Gains based on self-interest coincide with collective improvement in so far as they
do not aﬀect standards of behaviour negatively.
13Achieved status through occupation represents a remarkable innovation compared
to pre-industrial societies, where status was essentially ascribed (e.g. derived from non
modiﬁable traits such as race, ethnicity, sex, physical features, or transmitted to a person
through inheritance); see Tumin (1967).
10On the one hand, if a certain job is much valued, there will be many aspirants
to the corresponding positions; insiders, however, may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
shelter that segment from competition. As a result, unemployment may
occur. The restrictions reinforce the appeal of that occupation, though,
thereby increasing its social value. On the other hand, conformity may also
act as a social regulator of labour market: a family background is often a
source of opportunities and constraints, usually inducing choice paths that
reinforce original status. Restrictions based on cultural barriers will act on
this, ensuring that the number of people competing for high status job will
never be extremely high. The ﬁnal outcome will depend on the relative
strenght of positive and negative feedbacks, as we shall show.
3.2 The construction of preferences
The inquiry into how individuals choose what job to look for requires an
analysis of the process of preference formation, and of the process whereby
preferences are enacted (Levine 1998). As Amartya Sen has pointed out, any
action is based on some prior evaluation process. This concerns both the
designation of objects of value and their valuation. Utilitarianism makes it
very simple: valuable objects are actions that deliver utility and they are
valued according to the utility they yield to the acting individual. Standard
economics accordingly relegates the issue of preference formation outside its
ﬁeld of study. This stance is instrumental to the “common metric” view
discussed above, as is based on the postulate that individuals follow self-
centered utilitarian patterns of action. This assumption is rather restrictive,
and it may be misleading (Sen and Williams 1982).
Individuals may be driven by other motivations and feelings, as Sen (1991)
points out. Self-respect, participation to community, emotional feelings,
search for honour, altruism etc. are remarkable examples. More speciﬁc
to labour supply, it should then be considered that a person’s work is an
essential step for self-expression and the costruction of personality. The job
one chooses may also reﬂect passions and inspirations, speciﬁc abilities and
propensities, or other driving forces. Moreover, a person’s job is the major
source of his social identity. As noted above, people are socially valued for
what they do, their living standards and their economic autonomy (i.e. de-
pendence on needs), the nature and the structure of their rights and their
duties (i.e. power and command). All this leads to suggest that individuals
assign a high value to occupations that comply with the construction of their
self-image and with the image others have of them. Put another way, oc-
cupational status provides the economic and social status people are valued
11for.14 It is therefore important to stress that occupational choice does not
only involve a search for speciﬁc job characteristics; it is above all search for
status.
It can easily be seen that, if individual choice is free, higher status em-
ployment will be preferred. Status demand will direct labour supply towards
a restricted number of occupations. Excess supply will be likely to occur in
higher status jobs. Conventional economics assumes a disembedded economy
where any particular characteristics may be traded oﬀ for money. In such
an economy, income and power (or, say, fame, prestige, pleasant working
conditions) should be negatively correlated in the long run. In the space
of occupations, one chooses whether to have higher income and little power
or just the reverse, other things being equal. It is instead worth noticing
that status-related rewards (e.g. income, fame, deference, power etc.) are
not mutually exclusive but are somewhat correlated in bundles (Tumin 1967;
Reiss et al. 1961). This complementarity is essential to status: should in-
come decrease, the A-job status would also change. As a consequence, status
concerns may overwhelm any other beneﬁt by inducing a hierarchy in prefer-
ences, that is by actually framing choice so as to inhibit directions of search.
The labour supply tends to converge on a few employment positions, those
where the higher-ranked jobs are concentrated. The problem is whether dis-
equilibria will be regulated by price variations or not.
The self-regulating power of the labour market may be limited in a num-
ber of ways, according to the issues mentioned above. The ﬁrst case is one
where wages and salaries do not adjust downwards. This is possible if the
number of available high status jobs is kept scarce. Suppose job A grants
high status while job B does not.15 A-type jobs are chosen because high
status entails high income. The former are going to be scarce compared to
B-type ones. Everybody is going to line up for them, but obviously most
people will not get the job. Formal and informal mechanisms work to shel-
ter A-jobs from strong competition, protecting the existing quasi-rents. The
case of professions is typical in many countries. The positive correlation
between favourable characteristics is maintained and renewed through the
14According to Tumin (1967), occupational status is valued along three dimensions:
honour, that is the respect and deference that usually derive from the social consequences
of the role (possibly we may also add power, following Blau 1964/1986); popularity, which
depends on the attractiveness of roles (possibly based on scarce personal characteris-
tics); desirability – so similar a concept to the economic notion of preference – reﬂects
tastes as well as dominant cultural values in the community. These dimensions accrue
to occupations in diﬀerent amounts and reﬂect diﬀerent mechanisms of allocations of job
characteristics and rewards (e.g. income, other non monetary factors).
15We may think of the primary and secondary labour markets in labour market segmen-
tation theory (Doeringer and Piore 1971 cit.)
12institutional rules that govern access to the profession.16
The second possible case is when revenues decrease, but this does not
lower supply. If assessment of occupations is deﬁned according to a speciﬁc
feature, it is plausible that some choice dominate the rest in preference or-
derings. A typical description is that of lexicographic preferences, where one
characteristic is absolutely preferred to any other (Georgescu-Roegen 1954).17
We may think of those occupations where economic concerns lies outside the
realm of motivations (e.g. artists); but we may include any employment
where passion may be a strong motivator for individual choice.
Finally a third case exists that probably connects the previous ones. Pos-
itive social values – such as respectability – are ordering criteria for action.
They ﬁnd their rationale in the conformity to social attitudes or principles
that transcend monetary revenue. Examples are often provided by people
who are politically involved, old fashioned soldiers, priests. If we consider
status as one of such social principles, we can include in our list all those
commercial activities that are highly valued by the community. Thus, social
scarcity on the demand side and non-economic driving forces on the supply
side may interact. The outcome may be an imbalance which, for any given
occupational structure (which depends on demand side conditions), cannot
be removed by the standard self-regulating mechanism.
The imbalance we are talking about is, of course, unemployment. Ex-
cess supply for some high status job will entail supply shortages in other
lines of business. Economists usually refer to this type of unemployment as
“voluntary”: if people choose not to work in the sector with vacancies, it
only means that they are better oﬀ without a job. This is a private matter.
The framework we are developing tells another story. “Free” choice is in fact
bound to social tastes; a possible public concern is thereby surfacing.
Relative prices cannot regulate the market. Should A-job revenues de-
crease, their status would also change. This is not the normal case. Even
though this sometimes occurs (think of the changing status of teachers over
the past century), it takes decades of cultural change. When price variation
does not accomplish its task, equilibrium is only reached if redundant appli-
cants are pushed onto B-jobs. Eventually, equilibrium can only derive from
16High income may formally derive from, say, human capital investment, but this must
hold at the margin. What characterises sheltered high status jobs is that revenues are set
well above marginal costs.
17Alternatively, we may refer to the concept of metapreferences (Sen 1984) as guiding
principles in the solution of preference conﬂict. The two representations do not coincide:
the former brings in discontinuity in the preference set (Geogescu-Roegen 1954), while the
latter may determine its incompleteness (Sen and Williams 1981). Nonetheless, they may
easily lead to similar practical concequences, e.g. that some choices will dominate others.
13a forced revision of initial choices, and it is also likely to produce frustration,
cognitive dissonance, social exclusion. These are deﬁnitely public concerns.
No straightforward conclusions can be drawn from the above though. In
principle, capitalism fosters social and economic mobility. This is both a
condition for and a result of the correct working of the competitive mecha-
nism. Yet the social structure, which the economy is embedded in, provides
diﬀerent criteria for action. The social structure changes slowly, because it
requires cultural change and it encompasses reactions from vested interests.
The next section deals with two issues: on the one hand, which social dy-
namics characterizes and leads to the demand for status; on the other hand,
the intricacies of negative and positive factors which feed back and forward
on the dynamics of labour supply.
4 Occupational choice
4.1 The basic model of a stratiﬁed society
The proclivity to follow social standards calls for a more precise characteri-
zation of how social relations may inﬂuence labour market outcomes. This
is a multifaceted question. As an initial clue, consider that many empiri-
cal works do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between starting conditions (e.g.
parents’ education, father’s occupational status) and outcome on the labour
market (Picketty 2000). This contrasts with the expected eﬃcient outcome
of a free-market society, whereby allocation of people to jobs is based on
pure individual preferences, abilities and merits. Two types of explanations
may account for this result. The ﬁrst case is the relatively standard sug-
gestion that life paths reﬂect family economic constraints, thereby aﬀecting
the patterns of accumulation of human capital through education. In ad-
dition, there may be institutional features (e.g. imperfect capital markets)
reinforcing existing constraints on resources. The second explanation, rooted
in the bounded rationality tradition, stresses inﬂuences on preference forma-
tion. The hypothesis is that the family background poses cognitive and social
constraints that make the preference set incomplete and biased.
Despite their apparent exclusivity, the two explanations may be the two
sides of the same coin, since economic constraints and biased preference struc-
tures are likely to have a common origin in one’s personal history (e.g. higher
income families are more ready to invest in education because they have
higher expectations on children; on the other hand, they maintain privileged
expectations because they can aﬀord to invest much in education). How
cultural and material resources are strictly coupled was magisterially shown
14by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1979). According to his theory of
social action, individuals follow a set of internalized dispositions that derive
from the sedimented experience of previous generations, which has been so-
cialized. He calls them habitus. It deﬁnes a lifestyle, determining the choice
of disparate practices, from the most trivial to the more complex and mean-
ingful ones. Habitus implies that an individual internalizes objective chances
associated to the conditions of her family and its closest environment. Sub-
sequently, she transforms that set of opportunities into a path of subjective
aspirations and expectations.
An illustration of Bourdieu’s basic idea, adapted to reﬂect its application
to our argument, is provided by ﬁg.1.
Families are the ﬁrst social setting a person ﬁnds. Family status, syn-
thesized by its habitus, provides the criteria for action. Comparing one’s
own situation and ambitions with peers’ achievements and aspirations pro-
vides further stimuli. Social diﬀerentiation is reﬂected in the related steps
of judgement, tastes and their practical consequences: choice of pattern of
consumption, occupation and so on. Individual labour market outcomes are
therefore predetermined by the habitus, which channels the job search path
and provides the cultural coordinates for maintaining one’s position in the
social ranking. Bourdieu’s point is these outcomes follows naturally from the
structure of objective classes (although he admits individual deviations). In a
stratiﬁed society, everyone “naturally” ﬁnds his own place in society. Prefer-
ences represent the “practical assertion of a necessary diﬀerence” (Bourdieu
1979, p.53 of the italian edition). Truly free choice, in the scheme, is ex-
cluded. Moreover, the process is cumulative in nature, as is indicated by the
positive feedback from outcomes to status. Stratiﬁcation is consolidated by
practices that continuously mark the distance among classes.18
In the graph, we suggest a correspondence between Bourdieu’s concepts
and those used in economics (some of which have been introduced by Nobel
18Bourdieu calls it “histeresys of habitus”. It is worth noting that the very nature of the
habitus is its informality. It does not require that people make deliberate or even conscious
actions to perpetuate diﬀerences. The “art of living” is connaturate to the habitus of the
upper classes. A neat diﬀerence can be found here with respect to conspicuousconsumption
in Veblen (1899), who held that the leisure class made an eﬀort to denote its distinctiveness.
15laureate Amartya Sen). For instance, lifestyle (the unity of practices in the
diﬀerent ﬁelds of action) closely reminds us of a preference ordering – still a
coherent one, though incomplete and biased, socially structured by conditions
that are speciﬁc to each class. Sen’s capabilities, that is the possibilities
among which a person can choose in order to conduct his life, are reﬂected
in Bourdieu’s opportunities and expectations, while achievements (i.e. the
implementation of capabilities, that is the “things” actually chosen) can be
easily translated into outcomes (Bourdieu’s choice). Both capabilities and
achievements are deﬁned in the space of functionings, that is the whole range
of possibilities concerning what a person can be and what he can do (Sen
1991). According to Sen, inequality should be measured by diﬀerences in
what people can really do and get. The capability method, he believes, is
superior to both measurement of goods possessed, and measurement of the
distance from a desired goal: it is more objective than the latter and it
allows for more qualitative considerations than the former. Bourdieu seems
to follow a similar path, perhaps more radically: the capabilities of distinct
social groups diﬀer sharply, so that the notion of habitus suggests that the
space of functionings is partitioned.
;hat we have described here is a rather rigid social system, self-regulated
by a positive feedback (achievements-status) that maintains existing posi-
tions. Apparently, if the structure of values associated to jobs is consistent
with the occupational structure of the economy (the structure of demand),
everything is ﬁne (Blau 1994). Valuation of occupations follows from the
habitus; consequently, expectations of each group are rigid and stringent.
There seems to be no sign of possible overcrowding in any of them, because
everyone knows which is “his place”.
The process depicted is somewhat mechanical. We may want to allow
changes to occur somewhere in the causal chain above. Social mobility, i.e.
the upward or downward movements within a stratiﬁcation system, is the
most important disturbing factor. For Bourdieu, social mobility is a relatively
secondary analytical problem; the reason is that he believes that formal and
above all informal constraints on access to high-status occupations are at
work (and that they work well). This cannot be taken for granted.
4.2 Upsetting existing strata: individual social mobil-
ity
Social mobility is a key feature of modern society. In old, ceremonial societies
status is essentially ascribed (i.e. inherited) status. At the opposite end, pure
market economies should eliminate ascribed status. Individual merit is the
16criterion that provides the major source of capabilities. More speciﬁcally,
diﬀerent jobs yield diﬀerential income according to the skills and ability they
require. Income allows consumption of goods and services; utility from leisure
(and/or work) and consumption, as we said, is the only valuable criterion for
action. Inasmuch as the system of markets moulds modern industrial soci-
eties, we expect that innovative and meritorious people continuously upset
the social (economic) ranking. Social mobility is the norm.
Social mobility is introduced in the framework through expectations. As
mentioned above, their role is central in driving action (Blau 1964/1986,
pp.145ﬀ). Mobility reﬂects a distinction between settled expectations (de-
riving from the habitus) and emerging aspirations (deriving from reference
to the external environment and communication). Another way to see the
distinction is to consider it as the diﬀerence between actual status (status
inherited from the family social position) and desired status (the aspirations
and expectations one develops over time). At the outset, people ﬁnd them-
selves endowed with the cultural and economic resources provided by their
families. Suppose that their basic expectation is to replicate family tradi-
tion: this is consistent with the conformity principle recalled above (implicit
in Bourdieu). Yet social conformity may involve diﬀerent aspects (Tumin
1967). At a basic level individuals try to adhere to a basic standard of le-
gitimacy and morality. At a higher level, conformity means doing what the
community does, particularly what those members in their associational net-
works do (Bandura 1986). Still upward, conformity may incorporate change,
a move upward in the social ranking. Mobility requires that the existing cul-
ture value social innovative behaviour positively. If climbing the social ladder
is a valued behaviour, as it is in capitalist economies, this means that, rather
than following traditional trajectories as suggested by Bourdieu, people gain
from being social enterpreneurs. The external environment provides stimuli
to abandon established paths. At this stage, we suppose that the external
model (i.e. the model coming from the environment) may be stronger than
those arising within the family. This is shown in ﬁgure 2, where the lower
inﬂuence of ascribed status is revealed by the lighter colour.
Diﬀerently from ﬁgure 1, here preferences do not follow automatically
from status. They stem from the attempt to compare and make compatible
the diﬀerent aspects of conformity. Upward mobility implies a shift in the
individual’s goals. Her objective is to perform better than her peers. So-
cial psychology sees the attempt to improve one’s status as an innovating
behaviour. People with outstanding forethought capabilities (and who are
also more prone to taking risks) may develop progressive images of a desir-
able future for themselves (Bandura, 1986). They may adopt role models
(e.g. people of higher status) to learn from, or refer to symbolic and abstract
17models (e.g. from books or magazines). Since status incentives are extremely
powerful (ibid. pp. 238-9), successful steps in the course of action will also
reinforce active learning. In this case achievement in the labour market feeds
back positively on aspirations; more importantly, it feeds back negatively on
status (that is, mobility weakens the cognitive constraints posed by ascribed
status).
By the same token, increased occupational status entails greater oppor-
tunities in the future. The search for higher status involves, in fact, a search
for increased life opportunities (related to aspects such as health, fertility,
mortality) and lifestyle (concerning, for instance, consumption patterns, po-
litical and religious attitudes, personality) (Tumin 1967, ch.7 and 8). Put
in Sen’s words, higher status entails improved capabilities. As these are put
into practice, an even higher status is likely to be attained in the future. Sta-
tus may be seen as “expendable capital” (Blau 1964/1986, pp.132ﬀ.) both
in interpersonal relations and for personal development. If one uses this cap-
ital “productively” (e.g. by cultivating social relationships or by enhancing
his own education) we may anticipate a virtuous circle linking his acquired
capabilities to status (see ﬁg.2).19
This cumulative characteristic of status and of capabilities provides a
strong motivation for moving away from the initial position one ﬁnds himself.
Apart from social comparison issues, in fact, there are substantial reasons
related to the level of well being a person will attain. What is more, however,
is that increased capabilities means a greater set of open opportunities, that
is a greater positive freedom to ensure functionings (Sen 1992). This would
necessitate a discussion of what should be valued, from a private as well
19There probably is also a vicious circle of deprivation (Lipset-Bendix 1959), although
this is more questionable (Heath 1981).
18as a public standpoint. While this task is out of the scope of the paper,
a few considerations will be advanced at the end of this section and in the
conclusions. It will be shown that a) the attempt to increase capabilities
may be a reasonable strategy for an individual and that b) social mobility
is, under this respect, a socially good thing as it re-shuﬄes existing strata.
Unfortunately social mobility, while a feature of modern societies, is often
constrained and conﬁned to some speciﬁc social tiers. We should therefore
reﬂect on how to combine the two extreme cases analyzed so far: the stratiﬁed
and rigid society depicted by Bourdieu and the mobile, ever changing one.
4.3 A possible synthesis
If the framework suggested in ﬁgure 1 has some relevance, we should ex-
pect that some of the described mechanisms still hinder upward mobility. A
ﬁrst order of impedements comes from the interrelation among individual be-
haviours. If individual attempts to move up the social scale are positively re-
warded (in terms of achieved status), innovative behaviour may be imitated,
leading – mainly through observational learning of behavioural patterns and
social emulation in associational networks (Bandura 1986, ch.2 and 4) – to
a process of cultural diﬀusion of behaviours. But, owing to social scarcity,
diﬀused innovation cannot be rewarded indeﬁnitely (Hirsch 1976; Blau 1994;
Schelling 1978).20 The point is strictly related to the twofold nature of sta-
tus. Status not only provides an absolute reward, in that it allows to enhance
capabilities; it also provides a relative reward, in that it marks relative po-
sition in the social ranking. Diﬀusion of innovative behaviour is driven by
the attempt to capture the advantages of diﬀerential status (compared to
the position that is still occupied by peers); as the new position is achieved
by followers, the amount of diﬀerential reward decreases. When the pro-
cess involves the whole relevant population no diﬀerential prize is secured.
Eventually, while such a process leaves the relative positions of individuals
in the social ranking unchanged, it may still produce a positive eﬀect on the
absolute levels of status and capabilities.
It may then be asked how the whole status structure is aﬀected by this
collective movement – given that for the highest position no upward mobility
is possible. Bourdieu’s defense of his framework is interesting, because it
provides a sort of negative feedback to social mobility. A remarkable feature
of cultural capital is that the habitus of the upper classes allows members
to react promptly to – even anticipating – changes in social behaviour. Two
20Social scarcity occurs when satisfaction from using something is reduced as the number
of users increases. Hirsch explicitly refers to job opportunities as a salient domain of
application of the idea of social scarcity.
19routes may be taken. The ﬁrst one is that the relevant practices of the upper
class change as the lower classes try to emuate them. As a matter of fact, the
process of cultural diﬀusion of behaviours cited above involves new evaluation
standards and consequent new standards of behaviour (Bandura 1986, p.48),
provided the process lasts long enough and is appropriately rewarded.21 A
corresponding change in evaluation standards and practice at the upmost
level is therefore likely to occur. The second route is that upward mobility
does not involve some aspects on which class distinctiveness is based. In other
words, access to some practices is restricted. This is clear for professions, for
instance. In this case, direct or pure social scarcity – whereby satisfaction
derives from scarcity itself – is (re)created, rather than being incidental as
in the former case (Hirsch, 1976, p.22).
As we noted above, these adjustments occur mostly in informal ways.
On the one hand, since tastes are the “practical assertion of a necessary
diﬀerence”, distinction need not be sought. By “being themselves”, the elites
mark the distinction (this is the very strength of the link between habitus
and lifestyles in Bourdieu’s framework). On the other hand, there often
are secondary properties that help to deﬁne a position (e.g. a profession) in
selective terms: for instance, race, sex, age, place of origin, social background
may be used to tacitly discriminate people, excluding them or allowing them
to have access only to marginal positions (e.g., female doctors and black
lawyers may essentially have female patients and black clients).
As a consequence, we obtain that the process descibed in ﬁgure 2 is
combined with the forces depicted in ﬁgure 1. A possible synthesis is in
ﬁgure 3.
As a general rule, aspirations and expectations must be veriﬁed in subse-
21It is worth stressing that what is valuable, no matter whether for a person or a col-
lectivity, is not something immutable: it comprises relatively stable moral attitudes as
well as material displays, whose deﬁnitions and relative weighs in the evaluation standard
change over time.
20quent social and economic interaction. The path towards the desired status
is mediated/constrained by actual status, through the cognitive, social and
economic resources that the latter provides. Upward mobility is not blocked,
but it may be hampered. Social scarcity may be artiﬁcially created, whether
through formal norms or informal, tacit practices, but the force behind mobi-
lization keep on working. The main reason, we suggest, is that status choice
contains a substantial element of deﬁnition or satisfaction of personal iden-
tity – which goes well beyond the ceremonial aim and invidious attitude it
may nonetheless include. Occupational choice entails above all the choice of
a trajectory for constructing the self.
Propelled by a positive attitude towards upward mobility, the supply of
labour may target jobs for which labour demand is (kept) scarce. Indepen-
dently of high potential requests, low labour demand implies that actual
success is limited22 – relative to candidates, at least. Pure social scarcity
mechanisms exacerbate the inconsistency between diﬀerent levels of ratio-
nality: individually, it may be rational to pursue a goal; collectively, it is
obvious that a great deal of expectations are disappointed23.
If a trial proves unsuccessful a revision process must take place. A disap-
pointed applicant may react in two ways:
• by remaining unemployed, while still striving to ﬁll one of the few
vacancies (perhaps modifying something in the sequence of necessary
steps). This requires that a good amount of economic resources is
available, as a partial substitute for lacking cultural capital.24
• By pushing aspiration levels downward, to match expectations deriving
from actual status.
It is not possible to know a priori which revision path will be chosen. The
rationality paradox inherent in the social scarcity argument implies that the
goal is diﬃcult but not impossible to achieve: after all, some succeed. The
revision will be enacted by a divergence between the desired state and the
achieved outcomes, for which external or contingent factors may be charged;
the failure may well be deemed transitory. The way the individual frames
the situation is likely to aﬀect his subsequent decisions. He may infer that
22Here we point to the social mechanism that hampers goal fulﬁllment. It is not the
incapability to meet some requirement that produces disappointment, it is just the numeric
insuﬃciency of jobs relative to demand.
23In the case of incidental social scarcity, only the amount of reward is out of control of
the individual. In pure social scarcity, instead, either the goal is achieved or it is not.
24The rate of conversion of the two forms of capital is perhaps the most important
battleﬁeld in social dynamics, according to Bourdieu.
21some steps were wrong and should be revised; or he may conclude that his
hopes have been deﬁnitely frustrated. The degree to which a drastic revision
will occur is likely to be context-dependent and institutionalised. Factors
that inﬂuence the choice of conduct include personality and motivation, col-
lective perception and evaluation of negative diﬀerential status tagged to the
achieved job, awareness of other available opportunities. A crucial role will
be played by the relational networks and the resources possessed.25
Whether it is unemployment or downgraded employment that occurs,
however, the outcome entails relevant costs which stem from a social process
but accrue to the individuals involved. The problem is whether these costs
should be deemed social costs or, at least, if there is a social interest in
reducing them.
4.4 A partial conclusion
The above discussion has a range of implications in terms of the ensuing social
outcome. Let us begin by discussing the details of the costs involved if the
labour supply is forced into lower status occupations. Suppose a university
graduate seeks a job suited to his qualiﬁcation. When he fails, he unwillingly
starts looking for another job (possibly any job, if he is a constrained bread-
winner). Although standard theory would include this circumstance under
the heading of a “wrong investment in human capital” (which entails that
bad investors have to accept this response and, consequently, change their
goal), there are doubts whether the costs involved ought to be ascribed to
the individual only.
There are two distinct issues at stake here. The ﬁrst concerns who actu-
ally bears the costs of unemployment that stems from the mismatch between
supply aspirations and demand requirements. It may be that social costs
are involved. The second regards who ought to be held responsible for those
costs. In so far as there are signiﬁcant external inﬂuences on individually
borne costs, the question of who should bear those costs is also relevant.
Let us focus on the revision that follows an unfavourable labour market
outcome. If the original search for higher status required investment in hu-
man capital, at least part of it will be jeopardized.26 This cost is mainly
private, as underlined by the “wrong investment” argument recalled above.
Yet there is a social counterpart. When a worker is employed in a position
25These factors interact to determine the process of revision, which will reasonably take
longer the larger the divergence, the higher the motivation to stick to the original choice,
the larger the amount of resources available to carry on the search process.
26It is not the inability to meet some requirement that produces disappointment, it is
just the socially determined numeric insuﬃciency of jobs relative to demand.
22that, given his qualiﬁcation, yields a lower productivity than potentially at-
tainable, this means that social product is lower than optimum; this is also
true if the person works less hours than standard working time. This out-
put loss founded the concept of disguised unemployment, introduced by Joan
Robinson (1937) and recently renewed by Eatwell (1996) and Covick (1998).
Individuals may also face signiﬁcant psychological costs. Frustration is a
possible outcome of the forced revision. On the other hand, an individual
may respond to an unfavourable outcome by enacting a cognitive dissonance
reduction process, which may entail diﬀerent routes. A basic one consists in
getting convinced that the initial condition was, after all, the only possible
one (a typical example that Sen refers to is people who accept to feel happy
with what they have). Alternatively, the process may lead the person to
adopt the construed belief that what she has reached is almost as good as
what he aspired to; either way, one may think that what she aspired to was
not actually as good as imagined27.
Such psychological costs also entail social costs. Apart from consequences
accruing to the national health systems, we may suggest that – using a
“human resources” line of reasoning – a frustrated labour supply may also
work less enthusiastically, i.e. at lower productivity. This cost is additional
to the one observed by Joan Robinson and her followers.
The next issue is whether the above costs are paid by the right subjects,
i.e. those responsible for them. Two extreme views are possible. The ﬁrst
one holds that only individuals should be blamed. Costs accruing to indi-
viduals are due to their inability to take into the account the more or less
obvious demand constraints. This case is less problematic than that of social
costs measured by the lower productivity of the labour force. If the loss of
potential output can be traced back to the same inability, then individuals
are actually shifting costs to the collectivity. In conventional terms, had they
appropriately assessed the nature of demand constraints, then their optimal
choice would have been a shorter and perhaps sharper search.
A second, opposite view is indeed possible; we found it in the diﬀerent
perspective we have adopted on individual choice. We think that the psy-
chological costs described above – while ususally considered an individual
concern – are in fact social insofar as they derive from a social process. As
we suggested, the job valuation process is not a matter of mere individual
will. Jobs are valued for the status they confer, which is socially deﬁned:
individual choice heavily reﬂects a system of collective values. Embedded-
ness implies that individual choice cannot be reduced to individual valuation.
27Many people accumulate frustration by simply accepting the job they get even though
it is far from their aspirations or even expectations.
23Even if individuals do not assess the constraints correctly, we should keep
in mind that scarcity is not objectively given, it is institutionally created.
If scarcity is artiﬁcial, the central issue turns out to be the distribution of
status, which on the other hand depends on the general, public attitude to-
wards mobility as well as on institutional constraints. The problem typically
arises when the hightened standard of living induces people to seek jobs that
are increasingly higher ranked than those which were hitherto the accepted
standard of worthiness. As we said above, the possibility for individual in-
volvement relates to the individual’s possibility to enhance his capabilities,
which in turn depends on the extent to which he can improve his status. In
this framework, the labour market is the arena where mobility ﬁnds richest
humus.
The key issue, here, is that there is a collective interest in encouraging
social mobility. As we anticipated, social mobility is probably the primary
mechanism that produces shifting valuation scales, thereby enhancing living
standards. Inasmuch as it is accompanied by a corresponding shift in labour
demand, the search for a better status induces a collective move towards
better jobs that, for the reasons outlined above, yields an improvement in
capabilities. In the long run, jobs characterised by socially unpleasant tasks
are displaced and substituted by better jobs. The structure of available op-
portunities is aﬀected by this mobilization. An evolutionary process of this
type has, for instance, marked the passage from agricolture to manufacturing
and from manufacturing to the service economy.28 What counts is that such
evolution brings with it increases in overall productivity. Moreover, the pro-
cess by which capabilities are collectively enhanced may be socially valued,
as Sen forcefully and repeatedly argued, for its consequences on the process
of economic democratization (see, for instance, Sen 1992; 1999).
If this argument is deemed relevant, then the fact that those objectives
(in a nutshell, the evolution toward a more democratic economy) are missed
because of counteracting social practices may be valued as a cost for the
collectivity. Accordingly, the fact that individuals do not accept to pay this
cost privately and try to stick to their aspiration without internalising the
extant constraints also has a positive ﬂavour. Voluntary unemployment,
far from being an ineﬃcient response to an eﬃcient mechanism, is a voice
mechanism against the social ineﬃciency of the socio-economic structure.
A possible criticism to this argument lies in the diﬃculty to disentangle
28The pattern appears to be well-rooted:
“economic growth by itself, with no redistribution, could remove the servants from the
homes of the middle class, because a less hard pressed population would no longer choose
to send its daughter to clean other families’ houses” (Wicksteed, 1910/1933 quoted in
Hirsch, 1976, p. 23).
24individual and social concerns. True, if there certainly is a social interest in
relieving men of fatigue and alienation, in rendering human life less depen-
dent on unsatisfactory occupations, in elevating human dignity and integrity
etc.; it may be that the search for better jobs, as described above, implies
a ceremonial attitude. Indeed, the status tagged to jobs partly reﬂects the
mechanism of invidious comparison that institutional analysis has stigma-
tised since Veblen. If we limit ourselves to this level of analysis, we almost
inevitably fall back to the individual cost type of argument: no social safe-
guard ought to be warranted to decisions that only serve individual interest,
even if they are inspired by (are entangled in) the social processes of valua-
tion.
The situation is far more complex, yet, thereby requiring further consid-
erations. First, suppose a person undertakes an action that aims at goal A
(competition for status), which is prejudicial to some social value, indirectly
pursues goal B (mobilization of society), which is valued positively by the
community. The claim that the action is certainly to blame is unfounded.29
Correlated to that, we note that the ceremonial attitude may be paralleled
by an instrumental side-eﬀect: a person who wants to graduate also improves
his education and knowledge, thereby sustaining a potential growth process,
independently of his possibly ceremonial motives. Second, the pursuit of
a better status remains a socially positive issue even if structural – rather
than artiﬁcial – social scarcity makes the pursuit of better jobs diﬃcult for
some and impossible for the rest. Any contrary claim inevitably supports
the status quo, with its structure of discrimination and inequality. This is-
sue pertains to economic democracy, and real labour markets are apparently
unable to deal with it.
Finally, some words are worth spending to introduce the discussion we
present in the rest of the paper. Suppose that the tension between the un-
changing job structure and the pursuit of a better job have a structural basis.
Individuals set their own standards according to the evolution of the social
valuation process while labour demand is bounded by technological change
and proﬁtability considerations. There is no need that the two should be
mutually consistent. Productive knowledge may be such that it is impossible
to improve working conditions and the job structure. The job structure that
arises from economic and technological evolution may or may not reveal an
increasing proportion of good (i.e. high status) jobs as opposed to bad (low
status) ones. What is good or bad is a matter of social valuation, indepen-
dent of technological requirements. Hence good jobs that are not provided in
29Take the motivation of proﬁt and the invisible hand as an example of how individual
interest may trigger social beneﬁts.
25suﬃcient amount by the productive sector will follow the principle of social
scarcity, which individual search runs into. This may produce unemploy-
ment, understood as the empty intersection between the desired jobs set and
the achievable jobs set30. Under these conditions, if individual status depends
on job status, it may be improved either by changing one’s job (given the
structure of “status tags”) or by changing the “status tag”. The latter case
entails a process of cultural innovation, which may, under some conditions,
be socially valuable.31
We have to deal with two important issues – individual development and
freedom, on the one hand, and economic order, on the other – which repre-
sent two sides of the same coin. Understanding their rationales may provide
some insights on the policy implications of unemployment. If technology and
production are objectively constrained, the crucial issue of the above exposi-
tion will presumably be ceremonialism. But if technology and labour demand
reﬂect institutional practices rather than natural conditions, the ceremonial
features of labour supply may turn out to be of secondary importance, and
the status/capabilities argument fully applies.
The fact that the conditions of labour demand may hinder individual
attempts to enhance capabilities calls for an analysis of the objective nature
of the knowledge that underlies production related choice and action. This
issue will be discussed in the section that follows.
5 Labour demand
5.1 Technology and eﬃciency
In conventional economics the demand for labour depends on the marginal
product of labour, which, in turn, depends on exogenous technology. Firms
aim to maximise real proﬁts. To achieve this goal they hire all workers who
are willing to accept the equilibrium wage. As a result, full employment
is achieved. To be true, a broad set of conditions must also be satisﬁed.
Even when ﬁrms are proﬁt maximisers unemployment may occur because
the allocating mechanism based on relative prices does not operate as an
eﬃcient coordinating instance. Circumstances that lead to this outcome
are known as market failures32. Whatever the speciﬁc account provided for
30Technological mismatch follows the same course of action, if emphasis is on skill re-
quirements.
31For instance, manual work has become stigmatized, especially in agricolture. On the
contrary, even manual works in services are deemed more honourable (think of McDonald’s
or of call-centers). It is likely that this process may be reversed with some social advantage.
32See Acocella (1998) for a survey.
26unemployment – an oligopolistic labour market where unions force ﬁrms to
pay non-equilibrium wages; incomplete information that leads workers to
seek jobs-wages that are not compatible with equilibrium; a monopolistic
goods market, which entails an incomplete allocation of resources – it is
taken for granted that, so long as ﬁrms maximise proﬁt, they are behaving
in an eﬃcient way.
Although a range of assumptions underlying this approach have been sub-
ject to criticism from diﬀerent strands of economic thought – they include
the notions of maximisation and substantive rationality (Simon, 1976), equi-
librium (Hamilton 1991), ergodicity (Davidson, 1994) – the discussion that
follows focuses on just two issues: the (eﬃcient) behaviour of ﬁrms and the
(exogenous) nature of technology. The two issues are strictly interrelated
and their implications for a proper understanding of unemployment are, in
our view, rather important.
We contend that 1) technology generally cannot be conceived of as an
exogenous circumstance; quite to the contrary, its insurgence is strongly re-
lated to business requirements; 2) a priori, business goals may or may not be
consistent with social goals; the problem is to assess whether, and to what
extent, the inconsistency exists; 3) endogeneity precludes the use of technol-
ogy as a benchmark to assess the social eﬃciency of business; an alternative
benchmark is therefore called for; 4) Sen’s notion of capability is a more
appropriate indicator of social eﬃciency, even though it is subject to similar
shortcomings as those of technology.
Our discussion begins with a short overview of four distinct theoretical
approaches to the above issues. We begin by referring to Veblen’s view of
technology and how he pointed out the social ineﬃciency of business. We
then introduce Leijonhufvud’s approach to innovation in the factory sys-
tem. We extend Leijonhufvud’s Smithian approach by introducing Dosi and
Marengo’s evolutionary account of how business innovates in the goods mar-
ket. Finally we examine Marglin’s radical economic claim that business is
socially ineﬃcient and that technology reﬂects this ineﬃciency.
A major criticism concerning the behaviour of ﬁrms comes from Veblen
(1921). He distinguishes technical eﬃciency from business behaviour. En-
gineers are required to organise production in order to maximise33 output
under given technological and resource constraints. In so far as they suc-
ceed, they achieve technical (and social) eﬃciency34. Businessmen, on the
33In the discussion that follows, maximisation is used in a loose sense. It is not meant
to imply substantively rational behaviour (Simon 1976).
34“The common good, so far as it is a question of material welfare, is evidently best
served by an unhampered working of the industrial system at its full capacity, without
interruption or dislocation.” (Veblen, 1919, ch. 5).
27other hand, aim to make money35. In so far as they succeed, they are ef-
ﬁcient on economic grounds. The two notions of eﬃciency do not coincide:
output maximisation is not the same thing as proﬁt maximisation36.T h i s
divergence may be measured in terms of what we might call an eﬃciency
gap: the diﬀerence between potential output (social eﬃciency) and actual
output (economic eﬃciency).
The diﬀerence between the conventional and the Veblenian views of eﬃ-
ciency depends on the assumption concerning business behaviour. The con-
ventional view is that proﬁt maximisation and output maximisation converge
whereas this need not be the case according to Veblen. However, the two ap-
proaches share the important assumption that technology is exogenous: it is
independent of business behaviour. It can, therefore, be used as a benchmark
to assess the eﬃciency of the latter37. From this perspective, unemployment
is the outcome of a technically ineﬃcient use of resources, which may depend
on market failures (conventional approach) or on the dominant role that the
vested interests of business have in modern society (Veblenian approach).
The use of technology as a benchmark requires that another assumption
must hold. The technological process must be as “that behavior which pro-
motes the life process”. This was Veblen’s view (Waller 1982, p. 765) but
it is not a convincing one (Swaney 1989) in that it implicitly assumes that
the tools associated to a given technology have an instrumental, as opposed
to ceremonial, nature. This need not be the case, as even authors close to
Veblen’s approach have pointed out38. In the rest of the paper we therefore
assume that technology includes “tools”, (individual) skills, the division of
labour and related (ﬁrm and industrial) competences, independently of how
they arise and of the use they are put to39. This allows us to freely dis-
cuss both the exogenous and the instrumental nature of technology, and the
implications this has for employment.
Following a Smithian approach, Leijonhufvud (1985) provides an inter-
esting account of technological change. He focuses on the relation between
the division of labour within ﬁrms and the introduction of machinery. The
35“The business man’s place in the economy of nature is to ‘make money’, not to produce
goods.” (1919, ch. 5).
36For instance, in so far as prices are set at too high a level to absorb potential output,
a conﬂict ensues between what businesses pursue and what a community needs.
37The centrality to Veblen’s research programme of the themes developed in The En-
gineers and the price system is stressed by Knoedler, Mayhew (1999). See also Knoedler
(1997).
38Bush and Tool (2001, p. 211), for instance, refer to the possibility of an “encapsulation
of technology within the ceremonial value structure of the community”.
39Some of the authors we will be discussing disregard some of the above elements but
the overall picture we provide should not be misleading.
28latter occurs every time a single task in the production process is so simple
that a machine can substitute the worker who is carrying it out. The reason
why tasks turn out to be so simple is that it is convenient to split them up
in order to cut production costs. As a result, the introduction of machinery
is a consequence – rather than a determinant – of changes in the division of
labour that occur on the shop ﬂoor. Technology is not entirely exogenous40.
The division of labour is based on conventional economic eﬃciency consid-
erations: the aim is to reduce production costs as much as possible. Leijon-
hufvud’s point of departure is that a team may substitute individual crafts-
men because in so doing it can achieve a greater output. Cost cutting is
independent of distributional issues. These arise only subsequently, when
that output has to be shared. This implies that the technology used is also
independent of distributional issues. It depends on considerations of alloca-
tive eﬃciency alone.
Leijonhufvud is concerned with the factory system, thus with what goes
on within a ﬁrm or an industry. Dosi and Marengo (1994) focus on the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnal market, thus on the need to meet some customer-related require-
ment. They follow a competence based approach whereby the activity of a
ﬁrm – what it does and how it does it - is to some extent, unique, owing
to its idiosyncratic (tacit) knowledge41. The authors point to two possible
strategies that ﬁrms can follow. The ﬁrst one focuses on competitiveness. It
consists in achieving “a quality as high as possible and costs as low as pos-
sible” (p.163). The alternative is strategising, i.e. changing a ﬁrm’s market
power independently of its competitiveness. The authors argue that strate-
gising is convenient when “every competitor notionally knows how to make
anewcar[...] equallywell”(ibid.) so that there is no scope for improving
competitiveness. Dosi and Marengo acknowledge that proﬁt maximisation
through strategising is possible but they deny that it is a general case. The id-
iosyncratic nature of knowledge, they argue, implies that competitors hardly
conceive of a good in exactly the same way. Thus, as a general rule, it is
more convenient for ﬁrms to follow a “competitive” strategy.
Despite the diﬀerences between Leijonhufvud’s and Dosi and Marengo’s
40Whether a machine actually exists that can substitute a worker, or how it comes into
existence, lie beyond the ﬁeld of inquiry set out by Leijonhufvud. In this sense, there
presumably exists a dimension of technological change that he deems exogenous.
41Competences are also referred to as capabilities. Slight diﬀerences exist in the mean-
ings assigned to the two terms - Dosi, Nelson, Winter (2000) provide an exhaustive survey
of the issue - but they are not particularly important from our perspective. What we
wish to avoid is confusion between the notion of “capability” in the theory of the ﬁrm and
organisation theory and the notion of “capability” as it is used by Sen. We will therefore
use “competence” when referring to the former.
29approaches, they share the idea that technology is the partial outcome of
a ﬁrm’s activity. Under these circumstances, technology may be used as a
benchmark to assess the behaviour of a single ﬁrm with respect to what other
ﬁrms are doing. Leijonhufvud’s approach suggests that there is a unique
pattern of technological development, whereby some ﬁrms may be expected
to be at a more advanced stage than others. Dosi and Marengo provide a
more complex framework but it may still be possible to judge whether a
ﬁrm is more innovative than others or – ex post – whether it chose the best
technology.
It is less straightforward that technology can be used as a benchmark
to assess whether ﬁrms (and business as a whole) are socially eﬃcient. The
issue is fairly easy to cope with when there is only one way for technology
to evolve, as Leijonhufvud suggests. Under these circumstances one might
conceive of social ineﬃciency in terms that resemble Veblen’s approach: a
technology gap would measure the output diﬀerence between the technology
actually employed and the technological frontier. The problem is that if
business is economically ineﬃcient, it is most likely that it will not seek ways
to cut costs – that is to say, it will not innovate – as it might. This implies
that the technological frontier will not reach its potential. In other terms, the
degree of economic eﬃciency aﬀects the position of the technological frontier.
Consequently, technology cannot be used to assess the eﬃciency gap: it is
not an independent benchmark42.
Let us extend our discussion to the case where technology does not evolve
in a unique way. This means that diﬀerent patterns of technological evolution
are possible, depending on the criteria that underlie innovation. In so far as
business innovates, new technology must meet the requirements set out by
business, which may contrast with those of other agents. Should this be the
case, business requirements would produce a technological bias in favour of
business, at the expense of other agents.
A technological bias has a twofold nature. First, the selected technology
may not be the one that allows the highest output to be achieved, all other
things given43. Second, the adopted technology may lead to a distribution
– or, more generally, to a quality of life for some sections of a community
– that is inconsistent with prevailing social values. Under either of these
circumstances, technology is not be an appropriate benchmark. It does not
provide an external and objective criterion to ascertain whether economic
42Thus, actual output may be compared to potential output measured in terms of the
existing technology (eﬃciency gap) or of potential technology (technology gap).
43This gap between potential and actual output resembles a technology gap. The latter,
however, is associated to a single technology whereas we are referring, here, to a range of
potential technologies.
30eﬃciency is consistent with social eﬃciency.
When Dosi and Marengo refer to competitiveness, they (implicitly) as-
sume that proﬁt seeking behaviour is consistent with the requirements set
forth by workers and consumers (and society as a whole). Distributional
conﬂict is substantially irrelevant and so is any conﬂict between consumer
requirements and proﬁt seeking activity. Based on these premises, there is
no scope for the insurgence of a technological bias at the expense of these
agents. On strictly qualitative grounds technology reﬂects collective wants
and may be used as an eﬃciency benchmark. In so far as technology is
qualitatively neutral – in that it reﬂects collective requirements rather than
some vested interest – technological unemployment cannot be the intentional
outcome of innovation, and the conventional claim that business should not
be held directly responsible for unemployment remains true. Unemployment
is a side eﬀect of economic activity, much like externalities.
The above assumptions underlying the qualitative nature of technological
evolution are open to doubt44. It is therefore important to examine what may
occur if we relax them. Marglin’s (1976) original contribution still provides
some interesting insights. He discusses the factory system in much the same
way as Leijonhufvud: the division of labour underlies the introduction of
speciﬁc techniques of production and the consequent development of new
technology. What distinguishes his approach, however, is the determinants of
the division of labour. Whereas Leijonhufvud focuses on a rather ahistorical
notion of cost-minimising teamwork, Marglin stresses that it is important
to know who directs the production process. He argues that the factory
system is the outcome of a historical process where capitalists created the
technical conditions that allow them to claim a right to a share of income.
Thus, distribution is a key issue from the very outset or, to put it bluntly,
it is not the division of labour (and technology) that eventually gives rise
to capitalists; it is capitalists who determine the division of labour (and
technology).
Much like in Veblen’s approach, Marglin argues that economic eﬃciency
consists in proﬁt – as opposed to output – maximisation and that the (eﬃ-
ciency) gap between these two outcomes corresponds to the social ineﬃciency
of the capitalist mode of production. His perspective, however, suggests that
a technology bias is also possible. In this perspective, so far as technological
44In a subsequent work, one of the cited authors acknowledged that while this approach
stresses “the coordination and problem-solving nature of organizational routines.” (Coriat,
Dosi 1998; p. 104; emphasis in the original), it “neglects the second major role of orga-
nization and organizational routines, namely their being a locus of conﬂict, governance,
and a way of codifying microeconomic incentives and constraints”( ibid.; emphasis in the
original).
31evolution depends on the intended actions of business, the insurgence of un-
employment need not be a mere side-eﬀect of economic activity. It may be
a social cost of capitalist accumulation.
5.2 Technology, competitiveness and distribution
The above discussion suggests that two views confront each other: the com-
petitiveness view and the distributional view. The competitiveness view
claims that ﬁrms try to improve their production process and /or their prod-
ucts and that, in so far as this meets the requirements set by customers (and
workers), technology cannot be questioned. Externalities may exist but this
has to do with the market, not with the rationale underlying the innovative
behaviour of ﬁrms.
We believe that this is a rather restrictive view. Leijonhufvud’s two-step
analysis – whereby teams try to raise the level of output, which is sub-
sequently subject to a distributional conﬂict – may be heuristically useful
but the second step of his analysis is not the end of the story. If we try
to reframe it in an evolutionary perspective, a range of unanswered ques-
tions arises. When workers resort to unions and claim ever increasing shares
of output, why should capitalists not shift their attention from output in-
creasing technology to technology that reduces the bargaining power of the
workers? In other terms, when teams turn into capitalist ﬁrms, why should
their behaviour remain unchanged?
As for Dosi and Marengo, can we actually draw a clear-cut distinction be-
tween strategising and the pursuit of competitiveness? Consider, for instance,
qualitative changes in a product that raise entry barriers. They may be con-
ceived of as competitive improvements which lead to a temporary monopoly
or, alternatively, as a pre-emptive investment that is being window dressed.
What is more, ﬁrms may actually pursue both goals at the same time: the
peculiarities of a product characterise it and position it in the market; at the
same time, they may create a niche that isolates it from competition45.
Let us suppose, however, that a distinction between the two strategies is
possible. Why should a ﬁrm neglect strategising if, given the time range it
deems important, such a strategy leads to higher net returns than a compet-
itive strategy? Truly, one might question the appropriateness of short-term
45There is no reason to believe that the market can prevent such a behaviour. Customers
can assess the quality of goods only within the context of the existing technology. They
can judge whether a pharmaceutical product will relieve them of their headache. However,
they will hardly be able to ﬁnd out whether a technically (and economically, from their
point of view) viable alternative would be possible beyond that technology. This issue is
discussed in greater detail by Ramazzotti, Rangone (2002).
32strategies that neglect long-term survival but short-termism may well be a
reasonable reaction to external circumstances, e.g. high interest rates (Perel-
man 1996).
The distributional view argues that the proﬁt motive depends on distri-
butional conﬂict. Whether the key issue is distribution between ﬁrms and
customers or bosses and workers is a minor issue; what is important is that
economic eﬃciency may well conﬂict with social eﬃciency. Independently
of externalities, business need not be consistent with social goals, thereby
determining social costs.
The problem with this approach is that there is no clear-cut way to assess
if and when the potential divergence between the outcomes determined by
business and socially desired ones actually arises. To clarify this point, let us
consider Marglin’s approach. Although it is insightful, it tends to disregard
that, when ﬁrms try to outcompete each other, they may cut costs but they
may also improve the quality of the products they sell. This entails that the
division of labour, the organisation of production and, ultimately, technolog-
ical change may be directed towards goals other than distribution between
“bosses” and workers and internal bargaining power. The pursuit of qual-
itative competitiveness, in turn, may produce path dependent patterns of
technological change, which diﬀer from those that distributional goals within
the ﬁrm would lead to.
The upshot of these remarks is that there is no ap r i o r ireason why ﬁrms
should restrict their activity to either “competitiveness” or distribution: the
two motives co-exist. Furthermore, it is reasonable that ﬁrms adapt technol-
ogy to their needs but it is rather diﬃcult to assess whether this determines
social ineﬃciency46. This implies that technology does not provide an appro-
priate account either of the eﬃciency gap, which depends on the extension
of the technological frontier, or of the eﬃciency bias, which depends on the
direction of technological evolution.
An important implication of the above discussion is that, since technology
is a key feature in the labour demand function, labour demand cannot be con-
ceived of as an unbiased function that workers merely have to acknowledge
and adapt to. Since unemployment is associated to the technology underly-
ing labour demand, long term employment policies should not disregard the
direction, as well as the intensity, of technological evolution.
Research, however, occurs also in other institutions, such as universities.
It is therefore important to assess whether scientiﬁc and technological re-
46The diﬃculty becomes even greater when strategies are not the deterministic out-
come of economic relations, i.e. “single-exit solutions” (Latsis 1976). See Groenewegen,
Vroemen (1997) for a discussion of this issue with special regard to the theory of the ﬁrm.
33search carried out by these institutions may provide the missing benchmark,
i.e. whether it may allow the assessment of the eﬃciency gap and bias de-
termined by business.
5.3 The creation of technology: science and vested in-
terests
Technological research is a search process. It ranges from ﬁnding the solution
to a very speciﬁc problem to investigating a ﬁeld of knowledge that may,
some time or other, turn out to be proﬁtable. In business, it may consist in
adaptations on the shop ﬂoor as well as in the activity of a think tank which
is only indirectly related to production. In the latter case, technological
research is basically the same thing as any other scientiﬁc research. In order
to appreciate how it is carried out in practice, it is important to understand
its general goals and its procedures.
Let us ﬁrst consider general goals. Two extreme situations may occur,
which may help to appreciate the above examples. The ﬁrst one is skill-
centred problem solving. It is a goal-related process where the agent involved
knows what he/she is looking for and knows how to pursue his/her search. M.
Polanyi (1962) provides an example by considering somebody who is looking
for her pen. She knows what she is looking for, she will be sure that she
ended her search once she ﬁnds it, and she (roughly) knows where and how
to search.
The other case is science-oriented problem solving. This is a self-referential
process where the agent does not fully know what she is looking for and may
not even know what procedures are more appropriate. A case Polanyi con-
siders is research in mathematics, an open-ended process of inquiry where no
speciﬁc goal exists and where the rules of the inquiry are established during
the process itself.
Let us now consider procedures. They must deal with at least three issues.
First, the boundaries of the inquiry must be established (Georgescu-Roegen,
1976). In a world where everything is – in some way or other – related to
everything else, the researcher must decide where to stop searching. The
decision relates both to the ﬁeld of inquiry (spatial, disciplinary, etc.) and to
the time assigned to the search process. However he/she sets the boundaries,
the agent involved takes a risk: beyond the boundaries he/she sets, something
important may be missed and there is no way to know; within the boundaries
chosen, a great deal of material may be of no use whatsoever and in some
instances, it may even be a “noisy” impediment to the search process.
Second, an aspiration level is required to decide where to draw the bound-
34ary (Simon, 1979). An aspiration level depends on the subjective characteris-
tics of the agent involved. It also depends on the requirements he/she has to
meet. These relate to method: how the community he/she refers to believes
things should be done47. They also relate to goals: it makes a diﬀerence
whether the outcome of the search process is expected to be knowledge for
its own sake or knowledge that must be put to use in a proﬁtable way48.
Third, setting a boundary involves some prior knowledge of the issue.
This may consist in speciﬁc knowledge available at the outset. It may also
include heuristics that suggest how to go about the search process. Generally
these heuristics are the result of past search processes (Egidi 1992; Dosi, Egidi
1991). They are applied to the new one because most often they are the only
learning rules available. This is important because it stresses that learning
is a path dependent process, based on past goals and past procedures.
Researchers – or a research community – are never “unbound”. The
procedures they resort to depend on the type of problem they have to solve.
Thus, in science-oriented problem solving, the establishment of appropriate
procedures is part of an ongoing search process. It is up to the research
community to choose what they deem appropriate.
In skill-centred problem solving, as well as in other goal-related search
processes, procedures are functional to the speciﬁc goal pursued. When the
latter is determined by business requirements, the boundaries of the problem
and the aspiration level are functional to those requirements. The ensuing
technology and knowledge reﬂect the business perspective that originated
them and are consistent with it. They also feed back on subsequent inquiries
in a threefold manner. First, old knowledge provides whatever background
information is used for subsequent inquiries. Second, the nature and exten-
sion of that background information depends on the procedures adopted, thus
on the priorities deemed appropriate for the past inquiry. Third, since old
knowledge is used to act upon reality, it generally determines an irreversible
change in the existing opportunity sets. Based on these circumstances, learn-
ing builds upon previous knowledge according to what we may refer to as a
learning path dependence.
Let us now consider independent research, i.e. research where speciﬁc
goals are not associated to business requirements. Usually skill-centred prob-
lem solving takes existing technology for granted. It is, therefore, inﬂuenced
in a strong way by learning path dependence and by the business priorities
47A Popperian scientist, for instance, would have to formulate falsiﬁable hypotheses.
48Loasby’s (1991) extremely insightful discourse is based on the assumption that busi-
nessmen and economists learn in the same way. A cautionary note, however, would be
required with regard not only to diﬀerent degrees of rigour but to the proﬁtability con-
straint that businessmen must absolutely meet.
35implicitly accepted in most inquiries. Science-oriented problem solving is a
more intriguing case. In fact, as we move from skill-centred problem solv-
ing to science-oriented problem solving, the boundaries of the system under
inquiry, as well as the required procedures, are ever more diﬃcult to deﬁne
in a unique way. Heuristics become a crucial tool. But heuristics basically
are past learning experience: there is no way to claim a priori that what was
appropriate for one aspect of reality (before) is going to be appropriate for
another aspect of reality (now). Furthermore, heuristics are not fully under
control because they involve tacit, as well as non-tacit, knowledge. The tacit
dimension comprises views that are absorbed indirectly, basically through the
normative and cognitive features of institutions (Scott 1995). So the issue
is where that tacit dimension comes from, better still, how it is originated.
Given the central role that economic activity has in capitalist societies (K.
Polanyi, 1957), it should be of no surprise that it is originated – or at least
aﬀected – by business requirements.
There are two ways that a business perspective may aﬀect the tacit dimen-
sion of technology and (scientiﬁc) knowledge. The ﬁrst way regards goals. It
consists in the conﬂation of business goals and social goals. Independently of
any purposive action that business might take to inﬂuence the learning pro-
cess, research focuses on issues that arise in our society. It therefore tends
to take it for granted that economic requirements must be met. Machine
manufacturers, for instance, appreciate the goals of their customers – other
businesses – thereby introducing equipment that meets the latter’s needs49.
Similarly, a common policy prescription is to foster strong cooperative links
between business and universities, or other research centres. The expected
beneﬁcial outcomes are grounded on the assumption that what business does
is socially eﬃcient. This introjection of business goals assigns them an ab-
solute value, so that they appear to be natural, much like the natural rate
of unemployment. The second way regards procedures. It occurs when the
procedures that are required to solve business related problems are conﬂated
with procedures that are required to solve social problems. A typical instance
where this situation comes to the fore is when issues concerning the provision
of public goods (health, education, etc) are dealt with in a business-like way.
We discussed the creation of technology as a cumulative learning process
based on general and speciﬁc goals, as well as on procedures. We also stressed
49This implies that, although Leijonhufvud and Marglin provide a causal account
whereby the introduction of machinery follows changes in the division of labour, the tem-
poral sequence may be diﬀerent: the introduction of new machinery may be the means to
carry out a division of labour. A post hoc ergo propter hoc account of reality would, how-
ever, claim that “exogenous” technological innovation is the cause of an objective division
of labour.
36that business related goals and procedures may be tacitly accepted within
independent learning processes. Finally, we argued that this inﬂuence may
persist over time owing to learning path dependence. The non neutrality of
technology implies that labour demand cannot be conceived of as a merely
technical phenomenon. In so far as unemployment depends on technological
factors, it may be conceived of as a social cost of business activity.
This discussion suggests that when business related knowledge is not con-
sistent with other perspectives – thereby leading to social costs such as unem-
ployment – it may be fairly diﬃcult for the latter to prevail unless completely
independent learning processes are enacted, i.e. processes where priorities are
properly assessed rather than taken for granted. Independent research may
provide an alternative to the prevailing business induced criteria in science
and technology provided that it has a benchmark to identify its goals and
procedures. The next section turns to this issue.
6 A social eﬃciency benchmark
Following Sen (1984; 1992; 1999), our point of departure is that economic
activity must ensure that people are free to choose how to conduct their
lives. This involves that they must have access to a wide range of possibilities
concerning what they can be and what they can do (functionings) and that
they must be able to choose how to combine them in order to achieve their
ends (capabilities). Unemployment stands out as an impediment to this
notion of substantive freedom and it is fairly reasonable that action should
be taken to prevent it. How it should be prevented, however, is a fairly
complex matter.
Choice of how to conduct one’s life is possible when the alternatives are
appreciated: it makes a diﬀerence whether someone chooses a job out of a
wide range of opportunities or takes it because he deems it the only one
available. There is an information problem, here: for any given amount of
vacancies, the agent must know what the choice set is, i.e. what job oppor-
tunities he has. A choice set includes the characteristics of the agent – his
skills, his wealth, his preferences - and what is made available to him: jobs –
with their skills requirements and their wage – and other circumstances that
aﬀect the quality of life: income, a range of “external” facilities concern-
ing housing, health assistance, baby sitting, etc., social relations, and social
status.
Information, however, is not the key problem. What is more important
is that the choice set may be narrow – i.e. there may be little to choose
from - so that the agent is only formally free to choose. The extension of
37a choice set therefore is a crucial issue. It is particularly so because there
is no reason to believe that it is given once and for all: it is itself a matter
of choice. The circumstances that deﬁne the extension of the choice set
are embedded in a choice context which frames the set. For instance, both
a worker’s skills and a job’s requirements depend on available technology
and on schooling and training facilities; “external” facilities depend on some
agency that provides them; social relations and social status depend on a,
broadly deﬁned, cultural context. Finally, as we shall discuss in greater
detail, preferences are associated to the cultural and knowledge context.
When unemployment arises – when the choice sets available to all agents
are too narrow to allow labour supply and demand to match – this is not
the natural outcome of exogenous circumstances; it is the consequence of
past decisions which determined the choice context. Those decisions were
the ﬁrst step in a path dependent process which eventually led to unem-
ployment. When unemployment arises, measures to contrast it depend on
the peculiarities of that process: decisions taken in the past widened or re-
stricted the range of the present choice context, thus the range of identiﬁable
solutions to present problems.
Random factors may, obviously, aﬀect these processes and the ensuing
choice contexts. It is, however, important to assess how sectional interests
may have a role. From the perspective of the distributional view discussed
above, “bosses” may ﬁnd it convenient to restrict the choice contexts of work-
ers. This would prevent the latter from interfering with business decisions,
including those that have to do with distribution.
Consider how choice contexts may be aﬀected by the division of labour50.
Given a set of tools and skills, diﬀerent divisions of labour are possible.
Whichever criterion is used to choose, the selected division of labour deter-
mines the routines of the ﬁrm and the tasks each worker has to carry out.
This aﬀects what workers must focus on and what they need to learn in or-
der to carry out their tasks. It also aﬀects what they can learn, because it
determines the information they have access to51.
The division of labour determines how creative or passive a task is, thus
the extent to which it involves decision taking. It ultimately determines the
degree of centralisation of decisions within the ﬁrm. Since learning both
precedes and follows a decision52, the less one has to decide, the less one
50The division of labour is only one instance of how choice contexts may be aﬀected.
For instance, economic, learning and value hierarchies are also inﬂuenced by how adver-
tisements match consumption patterns to the composition of output (Galbraith 1958).
51Since the competences of the ﬁrms depend on the skills of the workers, as well as on
the routines, they too are aﬀected.
52A decision involves a preliminary assessment of the issue but also a subsequent appre-
38learns. Those who suﬀer this deprivation of knowledge cannot appreciate
what is going on. They need to rely on whoever has that knowledge for any
interpretation of current events.
What this leads to is that the division of labour inﬂuences economic
hierarchies: who has the power to decide how to carry out economic activities
(Marglin 1976; Braverman 1974). It inﬂuences learning hierarchies: what
goals are deemed important in the skill-centred problem solving activities
that people carry out when they work, thus what competences and knowledge
they have to acquire. Finally, since those goals reﬂect a value judgement, the
division of labour inﬂuences value hierarchies: what is important and what
is relevant when judging what is going on. What all this leads to is that
the organisation of economic activity according to business priorities aﬀects
competences, knowledge and individual (and collective) preferences in a way
that is most likely to restrict the extension of choice sets and choice contexts,
thereby reinforcing the process depicted in ﬁgure 353.F r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t
of our discussion of unemployment, this not only determines a social cost
– here and now – to the unemployed, in that it reduces the capabilities of
the agents involved. It may cause a further social cost by restricting future
choice contexts, that is to say, the command people will eventually have over
their lives.
Not all circumstances favour business, however. As far as the division of
labour is concerned, rivalry between ﬁrms may change priorities so that its
main goal may shift from ensuring social control within the ﬁrm to increasing
the ﬁrm’s standing on the goods market. Furthermore, as a result of the
process that the division of labour initiates, the skills of the workers and the
competences of the ﬁrms change. It is also most likely that the tools become
obsolete and have to be substituted by new ones. At the very least a new
division of labour has to adjust to these changes54.
As for scientiﬁc research, although it is inﬂuenced by business, it is also
subject to patterns of evolution which depend on circumstances fairly ex-
ternal to the business environment: public ﬁnance, career dynamics within
ciation of the assessment in the light of the outcome.
53An example of the restriction of choice contexts is provided by emulation, as opposed to
revolt. It is in the interest of business to foster emulation in the workplace, through career
management, as well as in consumption, through advertisements. “Emulation replaces the
urge to revolt against the top people with the desire to climb into their ranks. It is the
strongest of all social control mechanisms. When people are harmed by vested interest,
emulation leads them to want their own vested interest. It is not the vested interest to
which they object, but their own lack thereof.” (Dugger and Sherman 2000, p. 71).
54Should this not occur “learning path dependence” might constrain or even preclude
subsequent choices of technology, thereby determining a “competence trap” (Levitt and
March 1988).
39academia, and the open-ended nature of the search process in ﬁelds of in-
quiry where immediate technological applications may not be intuitive. This
makes scientiﬁc evolution partly exogenous: changes in technology and in
overall knowledge may therefore result from unexpected breakthroughs in
research.
Finally, business related values may clash with extra-economic – e.g. re-
ligious - values. Thus, divergence over what should account for a given wage
– e.g. productivity (in a broad sense) or a standard of living – may foster
distributional conﬂict within ﬁrms. Ethical values – e.g. concerning what
should be the appropriate behaviour towards child labour or political dicta-
torships – may lead to conﬂicts between ﬁrms and their customers55.T h e s e
reactions may force business to change its strategies, thereby aﬀecting the
latter’s priorities and the patterns of evolution it would desire.
Far from being a mechanistic outcome of business behaviour, the evo-
lution of choice contexts is a typical case of what Kapp (1976b) termed
“sequential interaction within a cumulative process”. The openness of the
process need not preclude predictability but it does make it most unlikely.
What is crucial from our point of view, however, is that while a range of
circumstances reinforces the dominant role of business requirements, there is
also scope for “protective countermoves” and for a “double movement”56,s o
that an alternative to the social costs of business – including unemployment
- is possible.
7 Policy implications
7.1 Innovation and value judgements
In the labour market described by conventional theory a new technology may
aﬀect the marginal productivity of labour, thereby changing the shape of the
labour demand curve. It may also aﬀect the marginal disutility of labour,
thereby changing the shape of the supply curve. The new equilibrium may
involve a higher or lower level of full employment. The adjustment process
is going to be possible only if relative prices reﬂect these changes. When this
55The consensus pursued by business by diverting dissatisfaction towards emulation
can hardly be achieved when aggregate demand falls, thereby reducing both consumption
levels and opportunities to improve one’s job. The ensuing frustration may well expand
the scope for social conﬂict. Thus, even though emulation is functional to business, it may
nonetheless clash with business requirements.
56These are key concepts in K. Polanyi (1944); the relation between these concepts and
Kapp’s notion of social cost is discussed in Swaney, Evers (1989).
40does not occur, or if it occurs “slowly”, institutional changes may be required
to prevent unemployment.
When learning is taken into account, an eﬀect of technological change is
that agents must learn how to do new things or how to do old things in a
new way. Adjustment implies that ﬁrms have to change their competences.
Although each ﬁrm has its own core competences (Teece 1988), which re-
quire internal learning and adaptation, the horizontal – or social – division
of labour in modern economies enhances the complementarity of economic
activities (Richardson 1972), so that what a single ﬁrm knows is strictly
dependent on what others know. Thus, at the level of a single ﬁrm, it is rea-
sonable to consider technology as a basically exogenous phenomenon that the
ﬁrm simply has to adapt to57. At the level of business as a whole, however,
technology appears to be much less exogenous, as we argued above.
The eﬀects of technology depend on the requirements assigned to it. We
argued that they tend to be business requirements but that alternative – or,
possibly, complementary – requirements can also be taken into account. In
this perspective, technology can be a function of the socially desired level of
employment. Research goals and procedures would then have to reﬂect this
social goal. This is basically what Kapp argued in 1976b:
“In the future the social and natural sciences and applied technology will
have to be open to a much greater degree than in the past to environmental
and ecological constraints and objectives, that is, to explicit societal needs
and human requirements” (Kapp 1977, pp. 539-40).
We merely extend his conclusion – and we believe he would agree – by
arguing that employment is a “societal need and a human requirement” just
as the environment.
Which requirements – business or social – should be given priority to is
a matter of value judgement58. From this point of view it is worth noting
that employment issues raise more problems than environmental ones. En-
vironmental concern has increased over the years. The widespread claim is
that the future of humanity is at stake: the rate of depletion of natural re-
sources, on the one hand, and the degree of waste associated to production
and consumption, on the other, are changing the environment to the point
that not only our standards of living are unsustainable but even the survival
57Owing to the above mentioned technological interdependence among ﬁrms, however,
adaptation is not a ﬁrm-speciﬁc process. Each ﬁrm can adapt only in relation to how
other ﬁrms adapt.
58Since the nature of technology depends on which priorities prevail, when we refer to
a technological bias we do not imply that an “unbiased” technology is possible. Rather,
we believe that, depending on which priorities are chosen, some bias may be better than
others.
41of the human race may be undermined. Faced with the “doomsday argue-
ment” (Mayhew 1981), ﬁnding a solution to this problem would be in the
common interest, even though such a solution would be harmful for some
vested interest.
The common interest of ﬁnding a solution to unemployment is less in-
tuitive. Unemployment is of little concern for many who have a job. Up
to a point, it does not disrupt accumulation. Furthermore, even those who
acknowledge that it is the cause of economic waste – in that unemployed re-
sources imply a lower output – and of social grievance, may fear that action
in favour of the unemployed will prevent the eﬃcient functioning of the mar-
ket59. Indeed, as we argued above, when labour supply and labour demand
do not match, a most likely reason is that diﬀerent terms of reference clash60.
The meta-preferences of the workers and the technical requirements of busi-
ness reﬂect diﬀerent goals, and these goals are not comparable in monetary
terms. Thus, unemployment hardly implies doomsday; quite to the contrary,
it may be deemed good.
Apart from value judgements, two objections are likely to be raised against
the claim that technological change could be constrained by the socially de-
sired level of employment. The ﬁrst one has to do with the intrinsic nature of
innovation. It argues that innovators’ concern about unemployment is point-
less because they cannot predict what consequences their activity is going to
have, thus what eﬀect it is going to have for people’s jobs. Furthermore, even
though technology is endogenously created, the psychological intricacies un-
derlying innovation - the creation of novelty - preclude whatever action aims
to direct or even inﬂuence the mindsets of innovators. These objections are
noteworthy but they require some qualiﬁcation. It is true that the eﬀect that
technology has on employment often is unintentional. But this unintentional
eﬀect is more likely to occur when research is based on goals and procedures
that simply disregard unemployment. Furthermore, innovative activity oc-
curs within paradigms and trajectories that reﬂect, among other elements,
learning path dependence, thus previously established goals and procedures.
59An interesting case, in this respect, is that unemployment is likely to favour disci-
pline. This issue is stressed by scholars who follow quite distinct approaches. See, for
instance eﬃciency wage theory (Shapiro, Stiglitz 1984) on the one hand and Kalecki’s
(1943) political limits to full employment. The point, here, is to ascertain whether the
negative consequences of unemployment are oﬀset by the outcome of economic activity.
In most instances, it is those who are not unemployed that enjoy the beneﬁcial outcome
of unemployment. A distributional issue therefore emerges which is in stark contrast with
the common interest envisaged when discussing environmental issues.
60“It is needless to say that the fact that problems of social costs raise issues of income
redistribution makes them matters of political controversy and political power. (Kapp
1963b, p. 15)
42Even though single innovators cannot be forced to achieve a speciﬁc goal,
the guidelines of their innovative activity may be based on diﬀerent social
priorities.
The second objection is that any constraint on technological change would
feed back on proﬁtability, thereby leading to a drop in output and/or employ-
ment. We argued above, however, that reliance on a direct relation between
proﬁtability on the one hand and output and employment on the other may
be misleading. We stressed that unemployment is not (only) the result of
some market failure, i.e. the undesired outcome of individual behaviour. It
is (mainly) a social cost, determined by the way business operates, that is to
say, by its goals and its strategies.
Truly, technological change that does not reﬂect business priorities may
negatively aﬀect key economic variables such as proﬁtability, accumulation,
competitiveness, etc., and this might be the cause of a diﬀerent range of social
costs. The identiﬁcation of an appropriate policy requires a valuation of all
the social costs involved. It does not warrant disregard for the non-exogenous
nature of technological change.
7.2 Employment policy and technology
Let us now focus on the implications this has from a policy perspective.
Much like other agents, policy makers take their decisions in the light of their
“ends in view” – for any given choice set - and of their “ends”, the social
goals pursued which deﬁne the choice context61. Leaving aside the former,
recall that the “end” we are concerned with is the command individuals
have over their lives. As far as employment is concerned, this implies an
appropriate technological policy. In order to favour social – as opposed to
business – priorities in the creation of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge,
action must focus on learning strategies. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to provide an exhaustive list of possible measures. We only wish to outline
some key issues.
The ﬁrst ﬁeld of action concerns scientiﬁc cooperation between business
and public (or publicly funded) research organisations such as universities.
There may be instances where such a cooperation is useful but, since business
priorities generally do not coincide with social priorities, it may be appro-
priate that public organisations be equipped to identify how this diversity
aﬀects science and technology62. This public interference in the directions of
61The notions of “ends in view” and “ends” are discussed in Tool (2001).
62For instance, rather than focusing on how the division of labour may best comply with
the proﬁtability goal, research could try to draw inspiration from the social goals under-
lying the labor supply function in order to devise alternative ways to organise economic
43scientiﬁc and technological inquiry could lead to what Bush and Tool (2001)
call a Lisenko eﬀect63. However, the claim that scientiﬁc inquiry should be
subject to collective priorities does not imply either that it should comply
with the ends in view, as opposed to the ends, of a government or, for that
matter, of a community. It does suggest that scientists should not feel abso-
lutely free to do as they like. There is no doubt that, given the open-ended
nature of a great deal of scientiﬁc research, it is fairly diﬃcult for anyone
but the scientiﬁc community to claim that a ﬁeld of inquiry is more promis-
ing than another. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that what
“promising” means ultimately depends on the goals pursued, thus on how the
scientiﬁc community interacts and dialogues with diﬀerent sectors of society.
The second ﬁeld is education. A rather frequently held claim is that
education should allow students to ﬁnd a job. This cannot be denied but it
should not prevent the achievement of a diﬀerent goal: providing students
with an understanding of the world we live in, so that they may become
responsible citizens64. Training and general education need not coincide.
This may be one of the reasons why a problem arises with labour supply:
potential workers may wish to act as responsible citizens, thereby seeking
jobs where they can use their knowledge to the advantage of the community,
but this may turn out to be at the expense of the ﬁrm that hires them.
These considerations on education suggest that a diﬀerent view may be
required of educational entry barriers. Free access to schools and universities
raises costs and sometimes precludes teaching eﬃciency. Furthermore, since
students are not selected in advance, some give up studying when they realise
it is too demanding a task for them. Drop-outs appear to be a net loss in
that they do not achieve their degree despite all the money the community
spent for them. These issues should not hide the fact that, for the reasons
outlined above, education is a social – as well as an individual - goal in itself,
quite independently of whether a degree is achieved or not.
A ﬁnal ﬁeld of action concerns ﬁrms and their research activity. As we
recalled in section 2 unemployment relief systems and organisational rigidity
within ﬁrms are claimed to prevent workers from adapting to the require-
ments of labour demand. Relief systems and rigidity may be viewed as
socially appropriate, however, precisely because they shift the adaptation re-
activities.
63A Lisenko eﬀect “increases the degree of ceremonial dominance through the displace-
ment of instrumental values by ceremonial values. It is this process that is deﬁned regres-
sive institutional change” (Bush, Tool, 2001, p. 215).
64It is no coincidence that this was a favourite expression of Federico Caﬀ` e, one of Italy’s
major estimators of Kapp (see Caﬀ` e 1978), who used it to point out his main objective
when lecturing and supervising.
44quirement to ﬁrms: the latter would have to adapt their division of labour,
their skill requirements and, eventually, their machinery to what workers look
for.
8 Conclusions
The paper focused on a speciﬁc but crucial feature of unemployment: the
mismatch between labour supply and labour demand. It stressed that the
motives underlying labour supply may lead workers to pursue unavailable
jobs rather than ﬁll existing vacancies and that workfare programmes attempt
to make it less convenient for jobless workers not to accept the jobs they are
oﬀered.
The rationale of workfare is that mismatches occur because of market
failures and that incentives must be conceived of so that, when mismatches
do appear, supply may adjust to demand as soon as possible. We investi-
gated the motives underlying labour supply and stressed that there is more
to mismatches than mere market failures. While the above motives of jobless
workers may be “bad” - in that they prevent adaptation to demand - they
may be “good” in terms of existing social values. In other terms, it is reason-
able that individuals attempt to upgrade their social status despite labour
demand requirements: it is reasonable – as well as socially appropriate –
that they pretend to ﬁnd jobs that put to use the qualiﬁcations they have
acquired; it is reasonable – as well as socially appropriate – that they pretend
to design life trajectories that enhance their present and future capabilities.
We also investigated labour demand as a function of existing technology.
Leaving aside possible market failures, conventional economics has it that
when labour supply adapts to labour demand, it is merely adapting to exist-
ing technological constraints. This view, however, neglects that a great deal
of research has pointed to the – at least partial – endogeneity of technology.
It also neglects that business goals – which need not coincide with social
values – strongly inﬂuence how technology evolves.
Our discussion therefore pointed to the absence of an objective (i.e. gener-
ally acceptable) benchmark to assess whether it is labour supply that should
adapt to the requirements of labour demand or the latter that should adapt
to the former. We contended that the identiﬁcation of a benchmark implies
a value judgement. We consequently chose to base our discussion on Sen’s
notion of capabilities.
According to the capabilities view, we argued, there is no reason why the
ﬁrst envisaged alternative – supply adapts to demand – should be preferred.
In so far as technology is endogenous, economic action occurs both at the
45level of prices and quantities and at the level of learning, knowledge, and
technology. The latter is not a mere constraint.
Technology may aﬀect capabilities in terms of the freedom of choice avail-
able to individuals at any given moment. This is precisely what occurs on
the labour market: when a mismatch occurs, individuals cannot satisfy their
aspirations, and their freedom of choice is constrained.
Unemployment certainly causes social costs, at the psychological, social
and strictly economic level, but what we wish to stress is that it is in itself
a social cost: in so far as it is associated to a mismatch between business
goals and social goals – where the latter aim to improve the quality of life -
unemployment reﬂects the gap between potential and actual capabilities.
Economic policy is part of general public action. It co-determines what
Kapp referred to as sequential interaction within a cumulative process. Single
ends-in-view, such as providing everybody with a job, should be pursued with
clear ends, such as increasing the capabilities of the individuals involved.
This involves acting on how science and technology are created, bearing in
mind that any public or private action that copes with today’s unemployment
problems also aﬀects future technological development, with its opportunities
and constraints. It is the contrary of workfare, which restricts the available
choice set, reduces present and future choice contexts, and exerts no pressure
on technology to meet the requirements set forth by unemployed workers.
The above discussion was restricted to unemployment as a mismatch. It
did not deal with aggregate demand as a determinant of the level of employ-
ment. Our discussion suggests that the two issues are in no way inconsistent.
Quite to the contrary, we believe they are complementary and that policies
pursuing full employment should take into account the issues related to both.
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